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Article
The Legacy of Bryan v. Itasca County:
How an Erroneous $147 County Tax
Notice Helped Bring Tribes $200 Billion in
Indian Gaming Revenue
Kevin K. Washburnt
One day in the spring of 1972, a man walked across the
property of Helen and Russell Bryan near Squaw Lake on the
Leech Lake Indian Reservation, quietly measured the family's
new Skyline trailer home, and left without saying a word. The
Bryans were left wondering about his purpose.1 A short time
later, the mystery was solved when the Bryans received a tax
notice in the mail from Itasca County, assessing $29.85 in per-
sonal property taxes on the trailer home. 2 Though the tax was
small, it set off a chain of events that would lead ultimately to
the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bryan v. Itasca
County.3
The circumstances surrounding Bryan have never received
much attention in Minnesota. When Bryan was litigated, the
t 2007-2008 Oneida Nation Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Har-
vard Law School; Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
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the various people involved in the case in the 1970s, who assisted the author
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1. Interview with Helen Johnson, in Cass Lake, Minn. (May 25, 2007);
see also Complaint, Bryan v. Itasca County, No. 25081 (Minn. 9th Jud. Dist.
Dec. 8, 1973), reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at A-2 to -3, Bryan v. Itasca
County, 228 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1975) (No. 44947).
2. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
3. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
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case was overshadowed locally by the Leech Lake hunting and
fishing litigation, which sparked significant and heated atten-
tion by fishermen and other citizens of Minnesota. 4 Hunting
and fishing are near and dear to the hearts of Indian and non-
Indian Minnesotans alike; Bryan, by contrast, was an esoteric
tax case, and a seemingly insignificant tax at that. But while
the fishing litigation was only important locally, Bryan has had
national ramifications that continue to this day.
Bryan has received somewhat more attention nationally-
and it is excerpted in each of the leading law school case-
books 5 -but in the gaming context it tends to be overlooked. A
more recent decision, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians,6 is often credited as the legal foundation for Indian
gaming.7 While Cabazon is indeed an important case, its pri-
mary significance is that it followed Bryan's holding that Con-
gress, in granting Minnesota jurisdiction over the tribe under
Public Law 280,8 never conferred "general state civil regulatory
4. See Interview with Mariana Shulstad, former Field Solicitor, U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 1, 2006); Interview with
Steven Thorne, Esq., in St. Paul, Minn. (Aug. 22, 2006); see also infra note 132
(listing the cases associated with the Leech Lake hunting and fishing litiga-
tion).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 885-90 (4th ed. 2003); DAVID H. GETCHES
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 499-504 (5th ed.
2005).
6. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
7. E.g., Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Lost in the Shuffle: State-
Recognized Tribes and the Tribal Gaming Industry, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 327, 348
(2006).
8. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). With respect to the current
civil portion of Public Law 280:
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdic-
tion over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians
are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposite
the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdic-
tion over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State
that are of general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as
they have elsewhere within the State:
State of Indian country affected
Alaska[:] All Indian country within the State.
California[:] All Indian country within the State.
Minnesota[:] All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake
Reservation.
Nebraska[:] All Indian country within the State.
Oregon[:] All Indian country within the State, except the Warm
Springs Reservation.
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control over Indian reservations." 9 Bryan thus was the bedrock
upon which the Indian gaming industry began. And if there is
any doubt, consider that on the basis of the Bryan precedent,
the Indian gaming industry was generating between one and
five hundred million dollars in annual revenues before Cabazon
was decided. 10
If economic impact is a useful measure of importance,
Bryan may be the most important victory for American Indian
tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century. Indian gaming is simply the most successful eco-
nomic venture ever to occur consistently across a wide range of
American Indian reservations.1 1 The financial wherewithal
Wisconsin[:] All Indian country within the State.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or commu-
nity that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a re-
striction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall au-
thorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner
inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with
any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction
upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the
ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest
therein.
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by
an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority
which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civ-
il law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination
of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1360.
9. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 (1976).
10. See NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION 1998-2000, at 3 (n.d.), available at
http://www.nigc.gov (follow "Reading Room" hyperlink; then follow "Reports"
hyperlink; then follow "Biennial Reports" hyperlink; then select "1998-2000
Biennial Report" pdf icon) ("In 1988, tribal governmental gaming produced
approximately $500 million in total annual revenue."); STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT
& KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING & TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO
COMPROMISE 40 (2005) (estimating the figure at $110 million in 1988 and not-
ing that the Indian gaming industry grew rapidly throughout the 1980s); Ke-
vin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 427,
434 (2001) (estimating the annual revenue of Indian gaming at the time of the
passage of the Indian Gaming Revenue Act in 1988 at approximately $500
million); Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Protecting Indian Country from Crime: The Indian Gaming Working Group
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel04/
063004indiangaming.htm (estimating revenues of $100 million in 1988).
11. See Hearing on Off-Reservation Gaming Before the S. Indian Affairs
Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-scia/2006hrgs/020lO6hrg/Inouye.pdf ("I have personal-
ly witnessed the Indian gaming industry grow to a multibillion dollar indus-
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that gaming has brought some tribes has strengthened tribal
governmental services, including education, medical and
healthcare services, and a wide range of other social services. 12
Gaming has also given tribes tremendous clout in Washington,
D.C., as well as the ability to engage legal counsel in large
transactions and to wage litigation. 13
Given the financial ramifications of Bryan, one might rea-
sonably assume today that the case was brought by a large pri-
vate law firm or a well-financed plaintiffs' class action firm. In
fact, Bryan was filed and litigated entirely by legal aid attor-
neys, in an office with such a high rate of turnover that the
case was handled by a different attorney at virtually every
stage. 14 Absent the work of several young, idealistic (and al-
most certainly underpaid) public interest lawyers, who sought
not wealth, but merely to serve the nation's poorest citizens,
the Indian gaming phenomenon might never have occurred.
This Article places Bryan in historical context and gives
credit where credit is due. From the perspective of three dec-
ades, it describes the litigation and its ramifications, and high-
lights the work of the legal services attorneys who brought In-
dian tribes this landmark victory. Part I briefly describes the
try. It has proven to be the most successful economic development tool for In-
dian country."); Carter W. Hick, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Why Tri-
bes Can Build Casinos off the Reservation, 10 GAMING L. REV. 110, 110 (2006)
("It cannot be denied that Indian gaming is the most successful and lucrative
economic development activity available to tribes. The business of Indian gam-
ing generates billions of dollars annually."); Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn
R.L. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworks
for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV. L.J. 262, 279 (2003-
2004) ("[E]ven modest casino revenues and employment can have a dramatic
effect on tribes and the states in which reservations are situated.").
12. Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the
Success of Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47, 53-54 (2002).
13. In Minnesota, two large local law firms, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, and
Faegre & Benson, LLP, have successful Indian law practices, as do many other
firms. Outside Minnesota, many of the nation's largest and most successful
law firms handle Indian law matters. See, e.g., Little Six, Inc. v. United States,
280 F.3d 1371, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (listing "Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, of
Minneapolis, MN" as representing Little Six, Inc., a tribally owned operation);
Hopi Tribe v. Navajo Tribe, 46 F.3d 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing Arnold &
Porter of Denver, Colorado as representing the Hopi Tribe); Shakopee Mdewa-
kanton Sioux (Dakota) Cmty. v. Babbitt, 906 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D. Minn.
1995) (listing Faegre & Benson of Minneapolis, Minnesota as representing the
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Tribe).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37, 57-60, 104-05, 135-79, and
200-10 (demonstrating that there were different attorneys at the complaint,
appeal, petition for certiorari, and Supreme Court argument phases of the liti-
gation, respectively).
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litigation through the state supreme court. Part II discusses, in
much greater detail, the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Part III analyzes the unanimous Supreme Court opinion re-
versing the state courts and describes the breathtaking scope of
the opinion, as well as its implications. Part IV briefly describes
the development of Indian gaming in the years following Bryan
through and beyond the important decision in Cabazon. Part V
offers some insights from this important episode in American
legal history.
I. HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION THROUGH THE
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
The story of the Bryan case began with the aforementioned
visit from the Itasca County tax assessor to a parcel of land on
the Leech Lake Indian Reservation. Helen Charwood, a mem-
ber of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, was born on this land
near Squaw Lake, her grandfather's land, and the same land
where the trailer home would later sit. 15 The land was held, as
a lot of Indian land is held, in trust by the federal govern-
ment.1
6
On October 22, 1957, Helen married Russell Bryan, a
member of the White Earth Band of Chippewa, and he came to
live on the land with Helen. 17 During the course of their mar-
riage, Helen and Russell Bryan had five children, all of them
raised on this plot of land.' 8 In late 1971, the Bryans bought a
mobile home. 19 Helen borrowed the down payment from her
mother, who had received a cash settlement when Helen's
brother died in a car accident. Though it was not spacious, con-
taining only two bedrooms, the trailer was very welcome be-
cause it replaced a dwelling on the property that had burned
down.20
15. See Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1; see also Telephone
Interview by Julie A. Strother with Helen Johnson, in Cass Lake, Minn. (July
9, 2007) (indicating that "Charwood" was Helen Johnson's maiden name).
16. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 375 (1976).
17. See Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Helen Johnson, su-
pra note 15; Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
18. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
19. See Complaint, supra note 1, at A-2.
20. See Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
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A. THE COUNTY TAX NOTICE
Until 1972, just after the Bryans bought the trailer, Helen
and her family had never received a tax notice from the county
for property. 2 1 It was clear that the state could not tax real
property held in trust by the federal government, 22 but there
was an open question as to whether the state could tax a mobile
home, which arguably was personal property. 23
The tax notice from Itasca County came at a bad time for
the Bryan family. Russell Bryan was out of work and Helen
was the family's sole breadwinner, earning an hourly wage at a
local Head Start program.24 The first notice, dated June 1972
and levying a tax of $29.85 for two months of 1971, was soon
followed by a second notice in July. This notice indicated a tax
assessment for 1972 of $118.10.25
With five children and a husband to support on a meager
income, Helen could not afford to pay the tax. Helen later re-
called: "I was desperate. I couldn't figure out how we would pay
the taxes, and that would be every year you know."26 The taxes,
totaling $147.95, far eclipsed the ninety-two dollars that Helen
paid each month for the mortgage.2 7 Since the tax payments
were due thirty days from the time of the assessments, 28 Helen
was being asked unexpectedly to produce the equivalent of one
and one-half mortgage payments extra, in only a month's time.
Concerned about the cost of the tax, and yet desperate to
avoid the foreclosure that might result if she ignored the tax
bill, Helen called the newly established office of the Leech Lake
Reservation Legal Services Project (Legal Services Project). Af-
21. Id.
22. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 438 (1903); M'Culloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 343 (1819).
23. Bryan v. Itasca County, 228 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Minn. 1975) ("The issue
raised on this appeal is whether the State of Minnesota, or its political subdi-
visions, may impose a personal property tax upon a mobile home owned and
occupied by an enrolled member of the Chippewa tribe of Minnesota who re-
sides within a reservation upon land held in trust by the United States gov-
ernment for the tribe."), rev'd, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
24. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
25. Complaint, supra note 1, at A-2 to -3.
26. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. Stipulation of Facts, Bryan v. Itasca County, No. 25081 (Minn. 9th
Jud. Dist. Dec. 8, 1973), reprinted in Appellant's Brief app. at A-12, Bryan v.
Itasca County, 228 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1975) (No. 44947); see also Tax Notice
to Russell Bryan (June 6, 1972) (on file with Anishinabe Legal Services, Cass
Lake, Minn.).
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ter a brief conversation with an attorney, Helen mailed the
original tax notice to the Legal Services Project office. 29 Stapled
to the top of the tax notice was a short message. Helen wrote,
"Enclosed is the letter received from Itasca County Auditor! We
are living on tribal trust land."30 Since the tax notice was is-
sued to Russell Bryan, in whose name the trailer was titled,
Helen then signed her husband's name to the note.31
B. THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICE
In September 1972, attorney Patrick Moriarty, with the
Legal Services Project, filed an eleven-paragraph complaint in
the Minnesota District Court for Itasca County, styled as a
class action on behalf of Russell Bryan and others similarly sit-
uated, and alleging that the personal property tax was unlaw-
ful. 32 The complaint reflected an aggressive strategic decision
by the legal services office. At the time, it was clear that Itasca
County could not assess taxes on real property held in trust by
the federal government.3 3 Though a factual argument may have
been available that the Bryans' mobile home was affixed to the
land and thus ought to be considered nontaxable real property,
the legal services attorneys declined to argue that the Bryans'
trailer home was real property. Instead, they offered a much
more aggressive position: the state could not assess a personal
property tax on Indians living on Indian lands. 34 This aggres-
sive strategic choice would be reconsidered time and again, 35
but it ultimately paid tremendous dividends.
Before the case was decided, Moriarty left the office, and a
new legal services attorney, Nicholas Norden, made an appear-
29. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
30. Letter from Helen Bryan, signed R. Bryan, to Leech Lake Reservation
Legal Services Project (n.d.) (on file with Anishinabe Legal Services, Cass
Lake, Minn.).
31. See id.; see also Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1 (including
the statement by Helen Johnson that she wrote the note, but signed it as Rus-
sell Bryan).
32. Complaint, supra note 1, at A-3 to -4.
33. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 438 (1903); M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 343 (1819).
34. See Complaint, supra note 1, at A-3 ("[In actuality the County of Itas-
ca and State of Minnesota have no lawful authority to assess or impose a tax
upon his personal property ...."); see also Stipulation of Facts, supra note 28,
at A-13 (stating that the tax involved personal property).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 88 and 174.
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ance. 36 Because there was no significant factual dispute in light
of the decision not to raise the fixture argument, the case was
briefed on stipulated facts and without a trial.37 District Judge
James F. Murphy had little state court precedent to consider.
He considered certifying the question to the state supreme
court, but ultimately decided that he had an adequate under-
standing upon which to base a decision.38
In December 1973, Judge Murphy issued a decision. In his
opinion, Judge Murphy summarily rejected the Bryans' posi-
tion, holding that the state had the power to levy a personal
property tax on tribal members living on tribal land.3 9 While
the judge recognized that "the Leech Lake Indians were part of
a large Indian tribe, [and] that once upon a time they were an
Indian sovereign nation,"40 he noted that the Indians living on
Leech Lake were citizens of Minnesota, that they had access to
the justice system and county services, and that as citizens
they had the right to vote.41 He distinguished the Leech Lake
Reservation, an "open" reservation, from the Red Lake Reser-
vation, which was a "closed" reservation. 42 Following a four-
page opinion, Judge Murphy attached twenty pages of analysis
from a brief that had been filed by the State Commissioner of
Taxation on behalf of the County and the State.43
Before the case could be appealed, there was another tran-
sition at the Legal Services Project office. When the director
left, the office placed an advertisement in the Minnesota Bench
36. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment,
Bryan v. Itasca County, No. 25081 (Minn. 9th Jud. Dist. Dec. 8, 1973), re-
printed in Appellant's Brief app. at A-18, Bryan v. Itasca County, 228 N.W.2d
249 (Minn. 1975) (No. 44947) (stating that Patrick Moriarty was replaced by
Nicholas Norden as attorney for the plaintiffs).
37. Id.
38. See id. (indicating that District Judge James F. Murphy was the judge
deciding the case); Memorandum, appended to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order for Judgment, Bryan, No. 25081, reprinted in Appellant's Brief
app. at A-22 to -25, Bryan, 228 N.W.2d 249 (No. 44947) (indicating Judge
Murphy's consideration of certifying the question to the state supreme court
and outlining the legal principles used to support his decision).
39. Memorandum, supra note 38, at A-22.
40. Id.
41. Id. at A-22 to -23.
42. Id. at A-23.
43. Id. at A-25 (stating that the following twenty pages of analysis was
taken from the brief filed by the Commissioner of Taxation); see also id. at
A-26 to -47 (constituting the entire attached analysis from the Commissioner
of Taxation's brief).
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& Bar magazine, in search of a new director for the Legal Ser-
vices Project office. 44
C. ENTER JERRY SECK
Gerald ("Jerry") Seck was a young attorney looking for ad-
venture. He says that his wife did not want their tombstones to
say "born Minneapolis, lived Minneapolis, died Minneapolis," so
he applied for a Ford Foundation Fellowship in India.45 He was
accepted into the program, but the fellowship to India fell
through and the Ford Foundation assigned him to a university
in Nigeria. He and his wife sold their house and their car, re-
ceived a battery of immunizations, were feted at several going-
away parties, and were prepared to leave when the Nigerian
government suddenly stopped issuing visas. 46 After waiting
around for a visa for a few months, Seck became restless. One
day his wife called him and read to him the Legal Services
Project advertisement from the classifieds section of the Bench
& Bar magazine. 47
Seck knew only a little about the Leech Lake Reservation,
having spent a few weekends with his friend Dave Hanson at
Hanson's Leech Lake cabin within the Reservation's bounda-
ries. Still, he had experienced reservation poverty. At a pre-
vious job in the Twin Cities, Seck met a Leech Lake Ojibwe
man who was the building janitor. Seck often exchanged plea-
santries with the man. One day in winter, Seck asked the man
about his family, and the man responded that his children were
sick. Seck asked the man what had made them sick, and the
man responded that winter was always tough because they
lived in a tar-paper shack with dirt floors. When Seck claimed
that he did not believe the man, the man invited him to visit.
Seck arranged to visit Hanson's cabin on Leech Lake and ac-
cepted the man's invitation. He invited Hanson, a photojournal-
ist, along to take photos.48
When Seck and the photojournalist arrived at the Ojibwe
man's home, the tableau was dismal. They saw a tar-paper
shack with dirt floors and heavy-duty plastic for windows. Six
young children, all sick, peered out the door of the tar paper
44. Interview with Gerald Seck, Esq., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 10,
2006).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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shack. Seck decided to make it a personal mission to change the
man's life. He begged charities and, over the course of a year,
raised approximately five thousand dollars to buy the man and
his family a mobile home. 49
Seck soon realized that this family was not alone and that
the housing problem was a serious public health issue. He em-
barked on a long-term solution. One solution was an Indian
housing loan program, funded by the state, which would allow
Indian people to borrow money at a reduced interest rate. He
felt that the program needed at least five million dollars to be
successful, so he approached state Senate Majority Leader Nick
Coleman. 50 According to Seck, Senator Coleman initially
balked, so Seck used guerilla lobbying tactics. He followed Sen-
ator Coleman to the St. Paul Athletic Club and "from the sau-
na, to the steam room, to the whirlpool."51 Seck threatened to
follow Senator Coleman wherever he went every day through
the end of the legislative session until Coleman agreed to ap-
propriate five million dollars in an omnibus budget bill for the
new program. 52 Finally, Coleman relented, and originated the
housing program that ultimately allowed hundreds of Indian
people access to better housing.5 3
Thus, when Seck's wife called and mentioned the Legal
Services Project advertisement in the Bench & Bar magazine,
Seck likely understood some of the challenges ahead. Seck ap-
plied for the job and soon found himself being interviewed by
Bernard ("Bernie") Becker, who was a legal aid attorney in
Minneapolis. Seck and Becker knew each other because Seck
was a student in a welfare law class that Becker taught as an
adjunct professor at the University of Minnesota Law School. 54
Seck soon landed the job, committed to stay for two years,
and moved with his family to the Leech Lake Indian Reserva-
tion. Not long after taking the job, Seck's idealism collided
head-on with his pragmatism. He realized that routine legal
services work did not appeal to him and did not call on the
strengths that he had previously demonstrated. 55 Instead of
doing what he viewed as "glorified social work," he wanted to
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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have a greater impact. As a result, Seck began to limit his in-
take to about half of the normal case load and concentrated on
what he considered to be significant issues that could produce a
wider impact. 56
One such significant issue was the Bryans' personal prop-
erty tax challenge. When Seck arrived in Leech Lake in De-
cember of 1973, he took up the Bryans' appeal. Never having
worked in Indian law, the issues that the Bryans' claim raised
were new to him.5 7 He reached out to experts, though, and soon
found Dan Israel of the Native American Rights Fund
(NARF),58 a Boulder, Colorado litigation group established by
California Indian Legal Services. 59 Israel, who had worked on a
similar issue in the federal courts in Nebraska, helped Seck
flesh out the legal arguments for an appeal in the Bryans'
case.
60
D. PUBLIC LAW 280
The Bryan case would ultimately turn upon the effect of
Public Law 280. The U.S. Constitution grants the federal gov-
ernment, not the states, plenary power over Indian tribes. 61
Absent express congressional consent, states generally have no
power over tribes. 62 Public Law 280 was a termination-era act 63
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Native American Rights Fund, Our History, http://narf.org/about/
history.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008) ("In 1970 with funding from the Ford
Foundation, California Indian Legal Services[-]one of the federally-funded
legal services programs serving California Indians[-]implemented a pilot
project to provide legal services to Indians on a national level. That project be-
came known as the Native American Rights Fund (NARF).").
60. Telephone Interview with Dan Israel, Esq., in Boulder, Colo. (Apr. 4,
2007).
61. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 573 (1832).
62. Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
63. During the termination era, Congress took several actions intended to
end the trust relationship between the tribes and the federal government.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.06, at 89-97 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005). Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108
in 1953. Id. at 94.
[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the In-
dians ... subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United
States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant
them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citi-
2008] 929
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that granted enumerated states limited jurisdiction over tribes
primarily to deal with the issue of lawlessness on reserva-
tions.6 4 However, the language of Public Law 280 went beyond
a grant of criminal jurisdiction, forcing the Bryan litigants to
argue over the scope of the federal law.
Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 1953 in response to
the 'complete breakdown of law and order on many of the In-
dian reservations.' '6 5 Before Public Law 280 was implemented,
criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations was divided
among the state, the tribe, and the federal government, de-
pending upon the nature of the crime and the tribal member-
ship of victim and perpetrator. 66 Because the federal law en-
forcement "was neither well-financed nor vigorous, and tribal
courts often lacked the resources and skills to be effective," the
complex jurisdictional structure often practically resulted in
the absence of law enforcement on reservations. 67
Public Law 280 changed the jurisdictional structure of In-
dian country by granting five (later six) states specific criminal
zenship .... [I]t is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the
earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes ... should be freed from
Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limita-
tions specifically applicable to Indians ....
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
64. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction
over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541 (1975).
65. Id. (citing State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearings on
H.R. 495 and H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 82d Cong. 16 (1952) (statement of Rep.
D'Ewart)).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000) (stating that the general laws of the Unit-
ed States "shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any of-
fense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe"); id. § 1153 (listing offenses that, when committed in Indian country by
an Indian against an Indian, are subject to "the same law and penalties as all
other persons . . . within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States" and if
the offense is not punishable at the federal level, it "shall be punished in ac-
cordance with the laws of the State in which the offense was committed");
Goldberg, supra note 64, at 541 (describing the "irrationally fractionated" na-
ture of law enforcement on Indian reservations in 1953); cf. Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (finding that the conviction of an Indian for the
murder of another Indian in Indian territory was void for lack of jurisdiction).
67. Goldberg, supra note 64, at 541; see also 5 NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT
JUDGES ASS'N, JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: FEDERAL PROSECUTION
OF CRIMES COMMITTED ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 7 (1974) (describing the
many issues surrounding "allocation of jurisdiction for crimes committed on
Indian reservations").
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and civil jurisdiction over reservation activities. 68 Public Law
280 granted criminal jurisdiction in section 2 of the act by giv-
ing enumerated states
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the
areas of Indian country ... to the same extent that such State has ju-
risdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State, and
the criminal laws of such State shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State. 69
In contrast, the grant of civil jurisdiction in section 4 of
Public Law 280 was arguably narrower, reflecting Congress's
primary concern with law and order issues. 70 In section 4 of
Public Law 280, Congress granted enumerated states
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which
Indians are parties ... to the same extent that such State has juris-
diction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such
State that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State.
7 1
Although the addition of civil jurisdiction was perhaps not
the primary focus of Public Law 280, section 4 appeared to
grant the state broad civil jurisdiction over tribes. At the time
Seck appealed the Bryan case to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the question of whether state taxing power was included in sec-
tion 4's grant of jurisdiction had not been made clear by either
Congress or the courts. 72
E. APPEAL TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
Since Minnesota had no court of appeals at the time, 73 the
appeal was made directly to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 74
68. The statute specified five states that were willing to take responsibili-
ty for law enforcement over reservations, but allowed for the assumption of
jurisdiction by other states. See Goldberg, supra note 64, at 537-38.
69. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2(a), 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000)).
70. See Goldberg, supra note 64, at 541.
71. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4(a), 67 Stat. at 589.
72. See Goldberg, supra note 64, at 538 ("Among the matters in dispute
were whether states assuming jurisdiction under PL-280 acquired the power
to tax and zone on Indian reservations .... ). But see Omaha Tribe of Indians
v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421, 424 (D. Neb. 1974) (holding that Public Law 280
grants the states jurisdiction to tax tribal members on reservations), aff'd, 516
F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976).
73. ROLAND C. AMUNDSON, THE FIRST TEN: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF
THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS 29-31 (1993)
(explaining that on November 2, 1982, the Minnesota Constitution was
amended to create the Minnesota Court of Appeals and that the first members
of the Court of Appeals took the oath of office in November 1983).
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When it reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Bryan case
attracted attention from other interested parties. In addition to
the appearance of NARF attorneys on the Bryans' brief,75 the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe filed an amicus brief arguing for re-
versal. 76 The Tribe's brief was written by Kent Tupper and
Bernie Becker, 77 who was by then no longer a legal services at-
torney, but a professor at the William Mitchell College of
Law. 78 The United States also filed an amicus brief arguing in
favor of the Bryans. 79 The brief was written largely by Reid
Peyton Chambers, who was the Associate Solicitor for the Divi-
sion of Indian Affairs at the Department of the Interior.8 0
When it came time for the argument, Seck traveled from
his office in Cass Lake, Minnesota, to the state capitol in St.
Paul. He and his wife had only one car, so Seck traveled by
Greyhound bus-a journey of more than six hours.81
Though the Bryans did not attend,8 2 Seck packed the court-
room with tribal members, hoping that it would have an effect
on the court.8 3 He also attempted to use the position of the
United States to good effect. While the United States had not
asked for time at oral argument, and no attorney from the De-
partment of Justice was present, Seck introduced the Field So-
licitor, Mariana Shulstad, of the U.S. Department of the Inte-
rior, and invited the court to ask her questions.8 4 Surprised,8 5
74. See Appellant's Brief, Bryan v. Itasca County, 228 N.W.2d 249 (Minn.
1975) (No. 44947).
75. See id. (listing Dan Israel and two other attorneys from the Native
American Rights Fund on the cover page of the brief).
76. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe at 29, Bryan,
228 N.W.2d 249 (No. 44947).
77. Id. at 30.
78. Interview with Carol Becker, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 8, 2006).
79. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Minnesota Supreme
Court, Bryan, 228 N.W.2d 249 (No. 44947).
80. Compare id., with Letter from Reid Peyton Chambers, Assoc. Solicitor
for Div. of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Wallace H. Johnson,
Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 22, 1974) (on file with the
Minnesota Historical Society, Files of Bernard Becker, Minnesota State Ar-
chives) (referencing a previous letter sent by his office asking the Department
of Justice to seek leave of the Minnesota Supreme Court to file an amicus brief
in Bryan v. Itasca County, and including proposed text for an amicus brief).
81. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
82. Id.; see also Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1 (explaining
the Bryans' limited involvement with the appeal).
83. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
84. Interview with Mariana Shulstad, supra note 4.
85. Id.
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but apparently not flustered, Shulstad advised the court that
the United States was fully supportive of the Bryans' position.86
Itasca County's case, which by now was the State of Minneso-
ta's case, was argued by a young attorney in the Minnesota At-
torney General's office named Steven Thorne, who was appear-
ing for his first ever argument before the Minnesota Supreme
Court.8 7
As a matter of strategy, Seck revisited the decision by the
trial attorney who filed the complaint to make a broad chal-
lenge to the State's right to tax on Indian reservations. In his
brief and in argument, he sought to make the much more nar-
row argument that the mobile home was "annexed" to real
property, which was federal trust property, and thus exempt
from taxation.88
A former law clerk at the Minnesota Supreme Court, Seck
had many friends on the court. When the argument was fi-
nished, the justices invited him back into chambers to chat.
They congratulated Seck on his argument, but they gave no in-
dication as to how they would rule.8 9 Both Steven Thorne and
Gerald Seck left the Minnesota Supreme Court that day feeling
that they had made compelling arguments. 90
F. THE STATE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The case turned on the effect of Public Law 280, a termina-
tion-era law that gave Minnesota courts, and the courts of cer-
tain other states, jurisdiction over Indian reservations. 91 The
issue to be decided was the scope of the jurisdiction conferred
on the states by Congress in Public Law 280.92 The law gave
state courts full criminal jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction over
86. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 228 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Minn. 1975), rev'd,
426 U.S. 373 (1976).
87. Interview with Steven Thorne, supra note 4. Thorne later headed the
state's Department of Natural Resources and then worked as a private attor-
ney at Jacobson, Buffalo, Magnuson, Anderson & Hogen, P.C., an Indian law
boutique firm in Minnesota. Id.
88. Appellant's Brief, supra note 74, at 19-22.
89. See Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
90. See id.; Interview with Steven Thorne, supra note 4.
91. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)); see also William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 374 (1990) (discussing the intent of Congress in
passing Public Law 280 and the concurrent termination legislation).
92. Bryan v. Itasca County, 228 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Minn. 1975), rev'd, 426
U.S. 373 (1976); Appellant's Brief, supra note 74, at 1.
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all disputes and provided that "those civil laws ... that are of
general application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as
they have elsewhere within the State."93 Based primarily on
this language, the court had little difficulty deciding the case. 94
The Minnesota Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling
in favor of the State and against Seck and the Bryans. 95 Seck
had made little headway on the broader argument that the
State lacked the power to tax on Indian reservations. The
court's decision was concise, but thorough. It drew the bulk of
its analysis on the Public Law 280 issue verbatim from Omaha
Tribe of Indians v. Peters,96 a case decided two years earlier by
a federal district court in Nebraska, for which Dan Israel had
served as counsel. 97 The court also summarily rejected Seck's
argument that the mobile home constituted real property be-
cause it had not been alleged in the complaint. 98
When Seck read the Minnesota Supreme Court's unani-
mous affirming opinion, he was dismayed. 99 He immediately
began discussing the possibility of appeal. 100 Attorneys for the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe agreed that it was a good case to
appeal and, with continued support from attorneys at NARF,
Seck informed the Bryans that he would seek an appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court. 10 1
II. APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
By the time Seck began preparing the petition for a writ of
certiorari in Bryan, he was also preparing to leave the Leech
Lake Reservation to move to Micronesia, a small archipelago
93. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4(a), 67 Stat. at 589.
94. See Bryan, 228 N.W.2d at 255-56.
95. Id. at 250.
96. 382 F. Supp. 421 (D. Neb. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1975),
vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976).
97. See id. at 422; Telephone Interview with Dan Israel, supra note 60; see
also Peters, 382 F. Supp. at 422-26 (discussing McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), the language of Public Law 280, and
the fact that Public Law 280 does not give the state jurisdiction over Indians
by "implication," but rather does so clearly and expressly); Bryan, 228 N.W.2d
at 251, 253-55 (discussing the same).
98. Bryan, 228 N.W.2d at 256.
99. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
100. Id.
101. Id.; Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
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550 miles southeast of Guam, 10 2 where he had been recruited to
litigate a large land-claim case. 103 With the assistance of a new
legal services attorney, Kent Peterson, Seck drafted the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari. 104 He knew that it was a long shot,
but he bought Peterson a plane ticket to Washington, D.C., and
sent him to file the petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.10 5
By the time the writ of certiorari was granted in November
1975,106 a new director had taken over at the Legal Services
Project. 107 Seck was living with his family in Micronesia and
received notice by cable that the Bryan case would be heard by
the Supreme Court.108 Still the attorney of record, but stuck in
Micronesia, Seck soon received word that the Chippewa Tribe
would pay for his flight back to allow him to write the brief.109
Leaving his wife and two children in Micronesia, Seck flew
back to Minnesota for two weeks to work on the brief. For sev-
eral days in a row, Seck worked with Bernie Becker and Dan
Israel, who flew out from Boulder, at the law library at the Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law, where they drafted the petition-
er's opening brief.110 The new director of the Legal Services
Project, Michael Hagedorn, was also listed on the brief.'1 '
For Dan Israel, who had been working on the Peters case in
Nebraska 12 for more than two years, "the light went on" in his
head late one evening in the law library while doing research
about both Public Law 280 and federal termination legisla-
tion. 113 It became clear to Israel that "Congress intended the
civil portion of Public Law 280 to govern the where and how of
disputes and not to grant general regulatory power."114 To
Israel, the Congress that enacted Public Law 280 in 1953 was a
102. John H. Brandt, Nests and Eggs of the Birds of the Truk Islands, 64
CONDOR 416, 417 (1962).
103. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bryan v. Itasca County, 423 U.S. 923 (1975).
107. Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Michael Hagedorn,
Esq., in St. Paul, Minn. (Sept. 7, 2006).
108. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Dan Israel, supra note 60.
111. Brief for the Petitioner, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)
(No. 75-5027).
112. See Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421 (D. Neb.
1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976).
113. Telephone Interview with Dan Israel, supra note 60.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress that had enacted termination laws that explicitly
provided for the taxation of Indians by states. 115 Since Congress
knew how to draft explicit language thought to abrogate Indian
tax immunities, it knew how to be clear about such matters. 116
To Israel, the absence of clear language authorizing state taxa-
tion was a compelling indicator of the limits of Public Law
280.117 In addressing why Congress had not explicitly protected
Indian tax immunities in Public Law 280, the Bryans' brief
conceded that the scope of tribal immunities was not fully de-
veloped in the case law when Public Law 280 was enacted, but
argued that the Court had adopted a strict standard that "pro-
hibits the inferral of state taxing authority not specifically au-
thorized" by Congress. 118 Thus, the brief sought to use the am-
biguity to the Bryans' benefit.
A. BERNIE BECKER TAKES CENTER STAGE
After these theories were honed and the brief completed,
the only question that remained was who would argue the case
before the Supreme Court. As the attorney of record, Seck
wanted to argue the case but could not commit because of the
likelihood that he would be going to trial in his land-claim case
in Micronesia at the same time the case would need to be ar-
gued in Washington, D.C.119 From Micronesia, Seck discussed
the case by cable and letter with Bernie Becker and, to a lesser
extent, Dan Israel. Seck ultimately yielded to Bernie Becker to
argue on behalf of the Bryans. 120 Legal Services Project Direc-
tor Michael Hagedorn concurred. 121
Seck was very sorry to have to give up the argument. In his
last letter to Becker before the argument, he expressed confi-
dence in Becker's abilities, asked Becker to try to secure a re-
115. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 111, at 32-33; Telephone In-
terview with Dan Israel, supra note 60.
116. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 111, at 11 ("The limited scope
of the civil jurisdiction conferred can be most clearly perceived by comparing
Public Law 280 with the contemporaneous termination acts enacted by the
same 83rd Congress which unlike Public Law 280 made use of explicit lan-
guage to confer specific taxing authority .... ."); Telephone Interview with Dan
Israel, supra note 60.
117. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 111, at 11; Telephone Inter-
view with Dan Israel, supra note 60.
118. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 111, at 12-13.
119. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
120. Id.
121. Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Michael Hagedorn, su-
pra note 107.
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cording of the argument, and expressed melancholy about his
stint in Micronesia. "I'm getting very bored with things here,"
he wrote. "Every day is the same .... For those who dream of
living on a South Seas island, laying in the sun each day and
having no cares-All I can say is you have to try it."122 Turning
back to the upcoming argument, he predicted a reversal and
signed the letter, "Optimistically, Jerry."' 23
Dan Israel also wrote Becker shortly before the oral argu-
ment. In a letter, he described a recent nightmare about the
oral argument:
After talking to you yesterday, I went home and went to sleep. Sever-
al hours later I was awakened by one of Boulder's typical wind
storms. I tossed and turned all night and in the process had a dream
which dealt with our [upcoming] hearing before the United States
Supreme Court. The hearing was held on a New York subway plat-
form, I was late, you could not be heard by the Court, and the lawyers
for the State of Minnesota kept walking in front of us with big smiles
on their faces. The only reassuring thing about the dream was that
the State never got a chance to argue because the entire proceeding
was engulfed by the rush hour traffic.1 24
In some ways, Bernie Becker was a curious choice to argue
the case. Becker was born and raised in New York City. Al-
though he had moved to Minnesota to earn a law degree at the
University of Minnesota Law School, he immediately returned
to New York upon graduation. 125 Becker spent his first year out
of law school working for the Appeals Bureau of the Legal Aid
Society in New York, but his time in Minnesota had taken root.
After only a year in New York, Becker moved back to Minneso-
ta with his wife, Carol Becker, and immediately took a job with
the Minneapolis Legal Aid Society, where he spent the next few
years of his career. 26 By the time the Bryan case reached the
U.S. Supreme Court, Becker had become a full-time law profes-
sor at the William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, though
his legal services connection remained strong. 27
122. Letter from Gerald Seck, Esq., to Bernie Becker, Esq. (Mar. 26, 1976)
(on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Files of Bernard Becker, Min-
nesota State Archives).
123. Id.
124. Letter from Daniel H. Israel, Esq., to Bernie Becker, Esq. (Feb. 18,
1976) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Files of Bernard Becker,
Minnesota State Archives).
125. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78.
126. Id.
127. See Eric S. Janus, A Memorial to Bernie Becker, 17 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 409, 412 (1991).
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By all accounts, Becker was larger than life. Though a
physically large man, indeed unhealthily overweight, his per-
sonality exceeded his physical size. According to those who
knew him, Becker was a skilled raconteur, always ready with
an entertaining story. He spoke in perfect paragraphs and
could carry on a conversation single-handedly for a half hour or
more.128 Using teaching methods that he had learned from his
own potent professors at the University of Minnesota, Jack
Cound and Yale Kamisar, Becker could be intimidating to stu-
dents. 129 Other attorneys sometimes felt the strength of his
presence as well. Steven Thorne, who had been opposite Becker
on other cases before Bryan while at the State Attorney Gener-
al's office, described "Bernie" as "a big guy with a gravelly,
booming voice. He was always smoking cigars. He didn't follow
the Minnesota rules of discourse. He could roll all over you."'130
But despite the powerful personality, Thorne said that he "had
a heart of gold."'13
Becker had gained the trust of the Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe for previous work related to the Leech Lake hunting and
fishing rights litigation 132 as well as his amicus representation
of the Tribe in the Minnesota Supreme Court phase of Bryan. 33
Beyond his strong knowledge of Indian law, Bernie Becker was
a strong advocate and charismatic speaker. Heading into the
oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, which was his
first, Bernie Becker was well acquainted with the case. 8 4
128. See Interview with Mariana Shulstad, supra note 4; Interview with
Steven Thorne, supra note 4.
129. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78.
130. Interview with Steven Thorne, supra note 4.
131. Id.
132. See Leech Lake Citizens Comm. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa In-
dians, 355 F. Supp. 697, 697 (D. Minn. 1973) (declining to enjoin the state
from entering into agreements with the Chippewa Indians to address hunting
and fishing), aff'd, 486 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1973); Leech Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-06 (D. Minn. 1971) (holding that
the Nelson Act, which provided for allotment of Indian lands, had not abro-
gated Indian hunting and fishing rights); see also State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d
341, 343 (Minn. 1977) (describing the "long and acrimonious history of litiga-
tion concerning fishing and hunting rights in the Leech Lake area").
133. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, supra note
76.
134. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78; Telephone Interview by
Julie A. Strother with Michael Hagedorn, supra note 107.
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B. ORAL ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Bryan v. Itas-
ca County on April 20, 1976.135 Becker attended the argument
with his family, NARF attorney Dan Israel, and then-Director
of the Legal Services Project, Michael Hagedorn. 136 From the
gallery, Becker's wife Carol watched her husband anxiously.
Trusting that he was capable, but knowing also that he could
be too informal, Carol's greatest preoccupation was whether or
not Becker would keep his suit coat buttoned as she had in-
structed him.137 Perhaps because the Court was presided over
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who had attended the law
school where Becker then taught 138 or, more likely, because it
simply was a good forum for his personality, Becker seemed
very comfortable at the oral argument. 139
Becker was given time at the outset to begin his argument
without interruption. He began with the history of Public Law
280, which Becker implicitly acknowledged was an unusual
way to refer to a federal law, but noted that the term had be-
come "the jargon of the trade, so to speak," thus subtly commu-
nicating to the Court both his expertise in the area of Indian
law and his willingness to serve as the Court's guide. 140 While
presenting the history of Public Law 280, Becker flowed seam-
lessly into his argument by explaining that Public Law 280
gave the state courts jurisdiction only over criminal laws and
civil "causes of action."'141 According to Becker, Congress
stopped short of applying all state civil laws of general applica-
bility on the reservations in contexts outside causes of action.
He said,
135. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 373 (1976).
136. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78.
137. Id.
138. Chief Justice Burger, who presided over the Court, graduated from
the William Mitchell College of Law. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1,
Bryan, 426 U.S. 373 (No. 75-5027) (indicating that the oral argument was
heard before Chief Justice Burger and the eight other Justices); Sandra Day
O'Connor, In Memoriam, A Tribute to Warren E. Burger, 22 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 7, 7 (1996) ("Chief Justice Burger graduated magna cum laude in 1931
from Saint Paul College of Law, the earliest forerunner of William Mitchell
College of Law."); see also Robert M. Jarvis, A Brief History of Law School
Names, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 388, 406 (2006).
139. See Interview with Margaret Treuer, Tribal Judge, in Bemidji, Minn.
(May 25, 2007).
140. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 4.
141. See id. at 5.
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This is a lawyer's statute. Nobody uses "cause of action" in general
parlance. If somebody is going to say "The laws are applicable here,"
you are subject to that law. Nobody says, "You shall have a cause of
action" and what it shall be. It is just not the kind of language most
people would use unless they happened to be trained in the
law .... 142
Becker's first challenge from the Court was a hostile series
of questions from then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist,
who seemed less willing to interpret the "cause of action" lan-
guage as a limitation on the further provision that state civil
laws of general application shall apply on Indian reservations.
Asked Rehnquist, "Well, if I live in Itasca County and don't pay
my taxes, doesn't either the county or the state have a cause of
action against me for failure to pay the taxes?"'143 With his re-
sponse, Becker painted Rehnquist into a corner: "I think you
misread this statute if you read it as a termination statute be-
cause that is the way it comes out .... You are reading it, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, as, I think, as the termination acts have
been read. That is, all laws, civil and criminal, shall be applica-
ble."144
With Rehnquist as the foil, Becker then offered the Court a
way out of reading Public Law 280 as a termination act and ex-
plained why Congress had provided that all state civil laws ap-
ply to Indians as to all other citizens. He argued that Public
Law 280 was merely intended, on the civil side, to create a fo-
rum for civil disputes. Once that decision to make available a
forum had been made, "the problem arises what kind of law is
applied in that forum? What are the rules of decision?"145 Beck-
er's argument here dovetailed nicely with the leading scholarly
work on Public Law 280, an article by UCLA law professor Ca-
role Goldberg.1 46 The article built as part of its thesis an argu-
ment from legislative history that Public Law 280 had been
proposed primarily to deal with problems of "lawlessness" on
Indian reservations-that is, to make available forums for jus-
tice by Indians.147
Rehnquist was not willing to be put off so easily, however.
He noted that a provision of Public Law 280 provided that the
law did not authorize the "taxation of any real or personal
142. Id. at 5-6.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 7-8.
145. Id. at 8.
146. Goldberg, supra note 64.
147. Id. at 540-42.
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property... held in trust by the United States."148 According to
Rehnquist, 'You said a moment ago that this was a lawyer's
statute .... Now, certainly, a lawyer would read [this lan-
guage] as carving out a portion of authority that is otherwise
delegated, wouldn't he?"149
Becker countered that it was a savings clause, an assur-
ance to the Indians that Public Law 280 was not intended to
change the status quo. 150 Rehnquist responded, "If you wanted
to give the Indians some assurance, you would say nothing in
this section shall authorize any taxes on Indians or their prop-
erty, period."151 Becker respectfully responded that Rehnquist
had, at best, made the statute appear ambiguous, and then he
fell back to his argument that the legislative history of the sta-
tute had a clear purpose-not termination, but law and or-
der. 152
Becker's next challenge came from Justice Byron R. White.
White picked up on Rehnquist's line of questions and argued
that, if Public Law 280 was a termination statute, it only "ter-
minated" tribes in the areas in which it specifically applied. 153
Becker responded forcefully, suggesting that White misunder-
stood the statute, and explaining that Public Law 280 explicitly
gave every other state the ability to opt into the statute. 54 He
was then able to explain why South Dakota had not opted in:
"South Dakota did not [opt in] because of the tax problem be-
cause they felt they weren't going to get the revenue to achieve
that end."1 55 In parrying the questions from Justices White and
Rehnquist, Becker seemed to use every question to reinforce his
claims and to shed new light on his central argument.
Possibly because it was a convenient claim in the heat of
argument, or perhaps it sprung from ignorance, but Becker
oversimplified some of the facts related to the passage of Public
Law 280. He argued, in essence, that Public Law 280 passed
148. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4(b), 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2000)); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 138, at 8 (asking about subsection B of the civil jurisdiction section of
Public Law 280, "which purports to be an exemption from a much more gener-
al type of authority").
149. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 9.
150. Id. at 8-9.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id. at 9-10.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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precisely because "this statute was not imposed upon the In-
dians. The Indians came looking for this statute."'15 6 And they
did not oppose it, he argued, because everyone agreed that it
would not give states the authority to tax Indians on Indian
reservations. Referring perhaps implicitly to the Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, he argued that the tribes that had
adequate law and order "were exempted without any difficulty.
Nobody fought about it. Nobody argued about it."157
Justice John Paul Stevens then forced Becker to backtrack
on this point. He professed confusion regarding Becker's argu-
ment that tribes asked for the statute, on the one hand, and yet
it was up to states to opt in unilaterally. 158 Becker admitted
that tribes originally wanted a tribal consent provision, but he
said that there was agreement with tribes in the mandatory
Public Law 280 states. 159 Since it was then noon, Chief Justice
Burger interrupted the argument and ordered a recess until
1:00 p.m. for a lunch break. 160
Perhaps the only Minnesota tribal member who was
watching from the courtroom gallery that day was Margaret
("Peggy") Treuer, who stood in line at the courthouse since ear-
ly in the morning to make sure that she could watch the argu-
ment. Peggy Treuer had lived in Washington, D.C. since 1968,
and was then a law student at Catholic University. 16 1 She was
surprised that she seemed to be the only tribal member attend-
ing the oral argument. Sitting in the gallery, Treuer noted that
from the outset of the argument, Becker had been allowed a
significant period of time to begin his argument. She listened to
the discussion with interest, worrying when she thought that
the Court was focusing on an unimportant matter.162
During the lunch recess, Treuer wandered into the Su-
preme Court cafeteria for a sandwich. As she ordered her
lunch, she saw Becker sitting alone and eating. She approached
him and introduced herself, told him that she had grown up on
the Leech Lake Reservation, and, as a member of the Minneso-
ta Chippewa Tribe, thanked him for his work on her tribe's be-
half. When Becker asked her what she thought of the argument
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 13, 15.
159. Id. at 13-14.
160. Id. at 14.
161. Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
162. Id.
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so far, though, she did not hold her tongue. She challenged him
on his statement that tribes in the mandatory states had con-
sented to Public Law 280.163 Treuer could tell that it made
Becker uncomfortable that she was criticizing his argument
midstream, so a few moments later she politely excused herself
and left him to eat his lunch in peace.
Seeing the argument and interacting with Becker, howev-
er, made a positive impression on Treuer. The next summer,
she went to work at the Legal Services Project as a summer
clerk. Later in her career, she would return to that office as the
executive director. 164 Peggy Treuer's daughter, Megan Treuer,
has also worked in that office, now called Anishinabe Legal
Services. 165
When argument resumed, Becker returned to the consent
provisions regarding Public Law 280, tweaking his argument
slightly, no doubt to account for Treuer's criticism. 166 In re-
sponse to a question from the Court, he admitted that tax ju-
risdiction on Indian reservations was not at all settled at the
time Public Law 280 was enacted, but he turned this point in
his favor.167 He argued that congressional uncertainty provided
more reason to think that Congress had not intended to take up
taxes as a concept and, in any event, it had not undertaken
clearly to resolve such uncertainty. 168 Becker also argued that
if Public Law 280 conferred state taxing authority on Indian
reservations, Congress would have "slipped one by the In-
dians."'169
163. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 11; Interview
with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
164. Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139. Treuer was one of
the first members of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe Indians to earn a law
degree, earning her J.D. from Catholic University of America in 1977. Admit-
ted to the Minnesota Bar in 1977, Treuer currently serves as a tribal court
judge in Minnesota and has served on the Leech Lake Tribal Court, the Bois
Forte Band of Chippewa Tribal Court, the Upper Sioux Indian Community
Tribal Court, and the Red Lake Nation Tribal Court as chief judge. Id.
165. Id.; see also Anishinabe Legal Services, Who We Are, http://www
.alslegal.org/index2.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008) (stating that Anishinabe
means "the people" in the Ojibwe language).
166. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 15.
167. Id. at 15-17.
168. Id. at 16-17.
169. Id. at 18.
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C. IMPORTANT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF THE
CASE
The Court was clearly interested in the breadth of the ar-
gument. When the Court inquired as to the further ramifica-
tions of Becker's argument, asking whether there was any oth-
er kind of authority that was not conveyed, Becker may have
inadvertently foreshadowed the gaming controversy by noting
that his argument would include "certain other kinds of regula-
tory powers." 170 However, he quickly returned the argument to
the narrow issue of taxes. 171 This was to his advantage because
the Court had dealt with taxation before, and the case law sug-
gested that Indian immunity from state taxes was strong.172
Then again, it could have had the effect of narrowing the hold-
ing. Becker also accused states of only recently adopting the
broad reading of Public Law 280, implying that states too
agreed at the time that it was enacted that it did not confer
taxing authority. 173
Becker concluded his opening argument by attempting to
resurrect the very narrow argument that Seck unsuccessfully
attempted to raise in the Minnesota Supreme Court-that the
trailer was affixed to the land and constituted real property.174
In doing so, he drew a link to the issues of poverty that lay
within the case. Does the Minnesota Supreme Court's reading
of Public Law 280, Becker asked rhetorically, "mean that an
Indian who buys a mobile home because he is not rich enough
to put a foundation in, and concrete in the ground" suffers the
tax burden, though a wealthier person would not? 175 Becker
noted that fifteen percent of tribal members live in mobile
homes. 176
This argument drew the oddest question at oral argument.
Justice White tentatively offered that the use of trailers "is
consistent with the Indian tradition too, isn't it, to keep mobili-
ty?"177 While Becker played it straight, Treuer, in the back of
170. Id. at 19.
171. Id.
172. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 180-81
(1973) (holding Arizona's income tax unlawful when applied to Navajo Indians
living on the reservation and deriving their income from reservation sources).
173. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 19.
174. Id. at 21-22.
175. Id. at 22.
176. Id.
177. Id.; Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139 (describing Jus-
tice White's question).
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the courtroom, rolled her eyes and marveled at the ignorance of
a member of the Supreme Court. 178 Becker used the question to
end his opening argument with one more mention of the pover-
ty issue and the "rather absurd reading" suggested by the
State:
[A]n Indian who builds a home, has sufficient income to build a home
however small, and put a foundation in, is home-free because his
property cannot be taxed.... But an Indian who buys a mobile
home.., has to be judged by the number of bricks or blocks under-
neath the home to determine whether it is attached. Now, we don't
think the federal law requires that. 79
In contrast to Becker, the attorney from the State Attorney
General's office arguing on behalf of Itasca County was not at
ease. i s0 C.H. Luther was relatively new to the case; he had no
part in the drafting of the Minnesota Supreme Court brief and
came into the case for the first time at the U.S. Supreme Court
phase.' 8 ' Although he was a senior supervising attorney in the
Attorney General's office and was the Deputy Attorney General
for the State Department of Revenue, he was primarily a tax
attorney and knew little about Indian law. 8 2 Since the County
had won so handily in the state courts, he likely did not realize
the challenge that he faced.
When C.H. Luther reached the podium, he was given a few
minutes, like Becker, to begin his argument18 3 He adopted a
logical approach that might have worked well in another court
in another era. He offered to discuss "four considerations. One
is the statute itself. The second is the legislative history. The
third is the judicial decisions and the fourth is the policy."1i 8 4 He
then began discussing the statute by conceding that if the trai-
ler home was indeed real property, it would be immune from
the County's tax. 8 5 He quickly moved to legislative history, but
178. Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
179. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 22-23.
180. Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
181. Interview with Steven Thorne, supra note 4.
182. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 1; Interview with
Steven Thorne, supra note 4.
183. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 23-25. Although
Luther is asked a question almost immediately, the Court gave Luther signifi-
cant time to develop and establish his argument before any back-and-forth
questioning. Id. Notably, Luther was allowed the equivalent of two full pages
of transcribed text to outline his argument, although Becker was allowed
three. Id. at 3-6, 23-25.
184. Id. at 24.
185. Id.
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argued that it was not helpful. 8 6 When he reached his third
consideration, judicial decisions, he listed the Minnesota Dis-
trict Court and Minnesota Supreme Court Bryan decisions, as
well as the federal district court and Eighth Circuit opinions in
Peters, dealing with income taxes.18 7
A member of the Court asked which other kinds of taxes
might be involved, including income taxes, gasoline taxes, sales
taxes, and any other taxes of general applicability.18 8 Luther
responded affirmatively to each.18 9 When the Court asked
about inheritance taxes, however, Luther played into Becker's
argument, saying, "Well, the Indians are so impoverished that
it is doubtful that the inheritance tax would apply."'190 The
Court then guided him back to the personal property taxes
which were the immediate subject. This prompted Luther's
spontaneous concession that the personal property tax in Min-
nesota is not very broad and is primarily aimed at mobile
homes and similar types of personal property. 191
Turning to the policy considerations, Luther argued that
Public Law 280 was designed as an "integration and assimila-
tion" initiative. 192 He made a compelling argument that it
should be interpreted in that fashion:
Indians are citizens of the state.... [It is] only just and proper that
they bear their fair share of the expenses of the state .... [W]hy
should not these citizens of the state who are enjoying all the rights
and privileges of all the other citizens of the state share in the ex-
penses, at least to the extent of ... the sales tax, the gas tax, personal
property tax. 193
Having made his best argument, Luther soon began to
seem out of his element and flustered. An observer to the pro-
ceedings thought he was nervous and described him as "red-
headed and red-faced."'194 When a member of the Court asked
whether the mandatory Public Law 280 states were chosen
based on whether the Indians there were "more ready for assi-
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id.; see also Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421, 421
(D. Neb. 1974) (involving a challenge to a state income tax "levied against an
Indian's income derived from employment performed wholly upon an Indian
reservation"), aff'd, 516 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976).
188. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 26.
189. Id. at 26-27.
190. Id. at 27.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 29.
193. Id. at 29-30.
194. Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
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milation," Luther demurred by saying, "I'm not clear on that,
your honor."195
When subsequently asked why the Red Lake Reservation
was an exception to Minnesota's grant of jurisdiction under
Public Law 280, Luther answered,
Well, I would defer to Mr. Becker. He is more of an expert than I. I
think it was because they had a-what can I say?-a better tribal op-
eration there.196 In other words, they were able to handle their prob-
lems internally tribally where these other tribes didn't have as effec-
tive an organization. 1
97
With that, Luther abruptly announced, "if there are no further
questions, that is all I have,"198 and he took his chair, yielding
most of his time. 199
Stepping to the podium for rebuttal, Becker turned almost
immediately to the Red Lake question. He suggested that Red
Lake and other tribes were specifically exempted from Public
Law 280 "because they [had] ongoing tribal governments ... if
the idea is that this statute should be read against an assimila-
tionist, terminationist background, then you would think that
Congress would pick for termination of assimilation those tri-
bes that had advanced over the pupilage state which was" the
justification for federal involvement. 200 "Yet, in fact, it was only
the tribe[s] in the areas where the tribes were the least devel-
oped" where Public Law 280 was made mandatory.20 1 Becker's
argument thus sought to undermine the assimilation purpose
of Public Law 280 offered by Luther.
When a member of the Court noted that federal policy had
changed and "now [it] is to preserve the integrity of the tribes,"
Becker opined that perhaps the best purpose of the statute was
"to help the tribal governments along over a difficult period" by
195. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 30.
196. The loss for words here is curious. Luther may have been trying to
avoid the word "government," or he may have been honestly unsure of what to
call the tribal government.
197. Id. at 31.
198. Id.
199. See id. For comparison purposes, Becker's opening argument ranged
across more than twenty-one pages of the oral argument transcript, and his
rebuttal ran three more pages. See id. at 3-23, 31-34. Luther's entire argu-
ment filled only eight pages from beginning to end. See id. at 23-31.
200. Id. at 32.
201. Id. Though it was an expedient argument, the notion that Congress
had selected particularly dysfunctional or undeveloped tribes for the extension
of state authority under Public Law 280 is dubious in retrospect. See Goldberg,
supra note 64, at 543.
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making "state courts available."202 Before Becker sat down, a
member of the Court offered that Public Law 280 may have
done that, but stated, "I don't think it worked a major change of
subjecting the Indians to ... the full panoply of state taxes.
That would have engendered an awful lot of opposition from an
awful lot of tribes and it just doesn't come up anywhere in the
legislative history."20 3
Another Justice accused Becker of having conceded earlier
in the argument that no one knew which state taxes Indians
might generally be subject to when Public Law 280 was enacted
in 1953.204 Becker admitted that state tax authority on reserva-
tions was wholly unsettled and unclear, but indicated that In-
dians had not acquiesced to state taxes.205 He said that it had
not come before the Supreme Court, but "[t]here had been a
number of state court decisions." A member of the Court que-
ried, "Both ways?" Becker responded, "Umm hmm," and that
was his last utterance to the Court as Chief Justice Burger ga-
veled the argument to a close.206
During the argument, Carol Becker's worst fears were rea-
lized. Not long after the argument began, Becker unbuttoned
his coat.207 Although he failed to follow his wife's principal in-
struction, he had argued competently and had successfully
withstood difficult and aggressive questioning. Given the
strong way the argument ended, Becker had reason to be hope-
ful. 20 8 Becker, Michael Hagedorn, and Dan Israel left the Court
feeling comfortable with the potential for a reversal. 209 Howev-
er, there was clearly strong opposition reflected in the ques-
tions from Justices White, Rehnquist, and to a lesser extent,
Stevens. 210
After the oral argument, the attorneys returned to work
and nervously awaited the decision. Michael Hagedorn re-
turned to Cass Lake, Minnesota, to the Legal Services Project,
202. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 33.
203. Id. at 33-34.
204. Id. at 34.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78.
208. See id.; Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Michael Hage-
dorn, supra note 107.
209. Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Michael Hagedorn, su-
pra note 107.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 143-59.
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where he was joined by new summer law clerk Peggy Treuer.2 11
Dan Israel returned to Boulder to work on other litigation with
NARF.212 Jerry Seck continued his work in Micronesia, despite
the extensive damage caused by a recent typhoon. 2 13 Becker re-
turned to the William Mitchell College of Law to finish out the
semester, and then took his family on a long vacation. 214
Meanwhile, for the Bryans, life had improved. Russell
Bryan had found employment in road construction and Helen
Bryan continued to work with the Head Start program. 2 15 The
decision was not to come for nearly two months.
D. VICTORY
On Jerry Seck's first day back from Micronesia, he fielded
a call from Minneapolis Tribune reporter Nick Coleman 216 (son
of the state senator whom Seck had pestered to initiate the In-
dian housing loan program).2 17 When Coleman said, "Jerry, you
won!," Seck responded, "What are you talking about?"218 Seck
was thus informed of the unanimous ruling by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.2 19
Becker was on vacation with his family in Mexico when
news came of the Court's decision. When Becker received the
telephone call informing him of the victory, he shared the news
with his family by leaving the phone and shouting "nine-zip!
nine-zip!"220
It was Becker who called from Mexico to inform the Legal
Services Project office about the victory. Michael Hagedorn took
the call. Peggy Treuer, who sat in a cubicle in the corner of the
211. See Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
212. Telephone Interview with Dan Israel, supra note 60.
213. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
214. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78.
215. See Justices Bar State's Taxation of Reservation Indians, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1976, at 19; Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
216. See Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53; see also Jackie Crosby,
Coleman Campaign Opens with Promises, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.),
Jan. 13, 2005, at Bi (stating that Nick Coleman, writer for the Minneapolis-
based Star Tribune, and his brother Chris Coleman, candidate for Mayor of St.
Paul, are the children of the late Senator Nicholas Coleman).
218. Interview with Gerald Seck, supra note 44.
219. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 374 (1976) (indicating that the
decision was unanimous).
220. Interview with Carol Becker, supra note 78.
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small office, heard the normally reserved Michael Hagedorn
shout, "We won!"221
For Dan Israel, the victory was doubly sweet because it
vindicated his losing position in the federal district court in
Nebraska and the Eighth Circuit in Peters.222 Indeed, following
Bryan, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Peters, vacated
the decision, and remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit,223
which summarily ordered the district court to enter judgment
for Israel's clients. 224 When Seck called to inform the Bryans of
their victory in the Supreme Court, the ramifications of the rul-
ing for others was not something that occurred to Helen Bryan.
She simply understood that her family, and perhaps others,
would no longer be burdened by a personal property tax on
their trailer homes. 225
The Minneapolis Tribune carried the Bryan victory as its
top story in a banner headline on June 15, 1976, announcing,
221. Interview with Margaret Treuer, supra note 139.
222. See Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421 (D. Neb.
1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976); supra
text accompanying notes 96-97 (describing Dan Israel's role as counsel in the
case).
223. Peters, 427 U.S. 902 (granting certiorari, vacating the Eighth Circuit's
decision, and remanding the case back to the Eighth Circuit).
224. Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 537 F.2d 318, 318 (8th Cir. 1976).
225. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1. While the ruling gar-
nered them little local attention, the Bryans received a grateful letter from the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. The letter, from Arthur Gahbo, President of the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, read:
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Bryan:
As the President of our Tribal organization, I must take this op-
portunity, [o]n behalf of the Minnesota Chippewa tribe and our thou-
sands of Indian people, to express our sincere appreciation and admi-
ration for your courage, your dedication, and your perseverance that
resulted in the recent favorable United States Supreme Court deci-
sion that strengthene[d] and solidified the issue of Tribal Sovereignty.
Because of your noble stand in the face of tremendous odds and
against enormous opposition, a precedent of Tribal self-government
has been set nationwide that can only benefit Tribal people through-
out this vast country.
Please accept this letter and these humble tokens as emblems of
your Tribe's heartfelt appreciation to your Tribal Spirit.
Letter from Arthur Gahbo, President, Minn. Chippewa Tribe, to Mr. & Mrs.
Russell Bryan (Aug. 9, 1976) (on file with Helen Johnson). Enclosed with the
letter were two bronze tribal medallions. Id.; Interview with Helen Johnson,
supra note 1. The Tribe also gave the Bryans a trip to Escanaba, Michigan to
attend a meeting of the Tribal Executive Committee of the Minnesota Chip-
pewa Tribe, where they were honored with a dinner and briefly introduced to
the assembled tribal leaders. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
[92:919950
INDIAN GAMING REVENUE
State Forbidden to Tax on Reservations.226 The New York Times
printed a story on the same day on page nineteen, under the
headline Justices Bar State's Taxation of Reservation In-
dians.227 The Saint Paul Pioneer Press likewise reported, on
page fourteen, Court Limits Taxing on Reservations.228
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
Despite the way it had been characterized by the press, the
Court's unanimous decision in Bryan was striking for its
breadth. The Court had strongly resisted attempts by the
Bryans' cautious attorneys to focus upon either taxes or real
property. It issued a much broader holding, something that
may have been foreshadowed by the Court's original decision to
grant certiorari. There was no obvious reason for the Court to
hear this Indian tax case, particularly because there was no
conflict among the circuits. 229 In a preliminary memorandum
discussing whether or not the Bryan case would be a good can-
didate for certiorari, one clerk wrote, "The most persuasive ar-
gument for a grant may be that this Court has been particular-
ly solicitous of Indian interests... and the decisions in the
lower courts on this point have been against those interests."23 0
After deciding to grant certiorari, the Court did decide in favor
of the Bryans, the "Indian interest." However, the Court looked
far beyond the narrow tax issue before it and took the opportu-
nity to issue a much broader opinion.
A. THE SOURCE OF THE HOLDINGS
Like most judicial opinions, the Bryan opinion was not so
much an original work as a synthesis of arguments raised by
226. Dennis Cassano, State Forbidden to Tax on Reservations,
MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., June 15, 1976, at 1A.
227. Justices Bar State's Taxation of Reservation Indians, supra note 215,
at 19.
228. Ed Zuckerman, Court Limits Taxing on Reservations, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, June 15, 1976, at 14.
229. See Robert J. Nordhaus et al., Revisiting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe: Robert Nordhaus and Sovereign Indian Control over Natural Resources
on Reservations, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223, 268-69 (2003) (discussing the
book The Brethren and its allegation that the Supreme Court disliked both In-
dian and tax law cases, making an Indian tax law case an undesirable choice
for certiorari); Comments of DP (Aug. 20, 1975), attached to Preliminary Me-
morandum from Mason, Summer List 10, Sheet 4 (Aug. 19, 1975) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Collections of the Manuscript Division) (discussing
whether or not the Court should grant certiorari in the Bryan case).
230. Comments of DP, supra note 229.
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others. However, the Court did go beyond the briefs. Indeed,
the Court began its discussion of Public Law 280 in Part II of
the opinion with a citation to the leading article on the subject,
in which UCLA Professor Carole Goldberg framed Public Law
280 as a law designed to provide a judicial forum for crimes and
civil disputes, not a unilateral grant of broad authority to
states.231 The Court then articulated Professor Goldberg's cen-
tral thesis over several paragraphs and ultimately rejected "the
expansive reading" of Public Law 280 given by the Minnesota
Supreme Court and urged by the State Attorney General. 232 In
doing so, the Court echoed Becker's position at oral argument
that Public Law 280 was a "lawyer's statute,"233 primarily
about adjudicatory jurisdiction, not civil authority.234 Other-
wise, the Court noted in a footnote, it would have been codified
in title 25 of the United States Code (the Indian title) rather
than title 28, which governed courts and jurisdiction.23 5
Part III of the opinion offered a version of Dan Israel's law
library epiphany that the language of Public Law 280 could be
sharply contrasted with the various termination acts.236 In the
Court's articulation of the argument, "the same Congress that
enacted [Public Law] 280 also enacted several termination
Acts-legislation which is cogent proof that Congress knew well
how to express its intent directly when that intent was to sub-
ject reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws and
state taxation."23 7 The Court also cited a law review article that
Israel penned while he was working on the Peters case.2 38
In several places in the opinion one can see that the Court
favored Becker's argument that Public Law 280 was designed
to extend especially to "those reservations with the least devel-
oped and most inadequate tribal legal institutions."239 Evidence
231. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976); Goldberg, supra
note 64, at 541-42.
232. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 387-92.
233. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 5 (describing
Public Law 280 as a "lawyer's statute").
234. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384-85.
235. Id. at 385 n.l. This argument surely elevated the importance of a
nameless legislative clerk somewhere.
236. See id. at 389-90; supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
237. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 389 (footnote omitted).
238. See id. at 381 (citing Daniel H. Israel & Thomas L. Smithson, Indian
Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. REV. 267
(1973)).
239. See id. at 385-86 & n.12, 388 n.13; see also supra text accompanying
notes 145-47.
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suggested that the states were chosen based more on political
machinations by various states and the states' willingness to
undertake the costs of jurisdiction than any careful study of the
development of various tribal institutions. 240 The Court's accep-
tance of Becker's argument thus no doubt reflected the Court's
yearning to see rationality rather than crass politics or econom-
ics in congressional policy, especially when it concerned the na-
tion's solemn obligations toward Indian tribes.241
The Court's opinion also accepted an argument raised in
the Solicitor General's amicus brief,242 and credited in both con-
texts to Professor Goldberg, that a broad reading of Public Law
280 would undermine tribal governments and modern federal
Indian policy by making tribal governments irrelevant or by
"relegat[ing] tribal governments to a level below that of coun-
ties and municipalities." 243 This reference to contemporary fed-
eral policy was later revealed to be a telling insight into Su-
preme Court decision making.244
B. THE BREADTH OF THE OPINION
In language that would reverberate for decades with the
advent of Indian gaming, the Court made clear that its holding
was far broader than mere taxing authority. In the legislative
history, the Court found nothing "remotely resembling an in-
tention to confer general state civil regulatory control over In-
dian reservations."245 And, the opinion rejected the notion that
"tribal governments and reservation Indians were subordinated
to the full panoply of civil regulatory powers." 246 The Court
240. See Goldberg, supra note 64, at 543-44.
241. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385-86 ("[C]ertain tribal reservations were
completely exempted from the provisions of Pub. L. 280 precisely because each
had a 'tribal law-and-order organization that functions in a reasonably satis-
factory manner."' (citing H.R. REP. No. 83-848 (1953), as reprinted in 1953
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2412)).
242. As it had at the request of Associate Solicitor Reid Chambers at the
state supreme court, the United States once again appeared as amicus curiae,
and filed a brief authored by Harry Sachse, an Assistant to the Solicitor Gen-
eral, and several attorneys from the Department of Justice. See Memorandum
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bryan, 426 U.S. 373 (No. 75-5027); see
also supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing Chambers' letter to the
Department of Justice, requesting that it file a brief with the Minnesota Su-
preme Court).
243. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388 n.14; see Memorandum for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 242, at 10.
244. See infra text accompanying notes 255-70.
245. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384.
246. Id. at 388.
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thus ignored various attempts by the Bryans' own attorneys to
present a more cautious case, such as that the principle applied
only to taxes, or that the mobile home constituted federal trust
property. 247 The Court aggressively staked out a position
broader than that advocated by the Bryans.
The loss was probably surprising to the Attorney General's
office, and the fact that the opinion was unanimous was equally
surprising to the Bryans' attorneys. 248 Apparently, even Justice
Rehnquist was won over. Despite the fact that he had made a
reasonable-and even somewhat compelling-textual argument
that Public Law 280 was a partial termination statute, he
chose not to dissent.249
The unanimous decision by the Court may be explained by
the fact that it was Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivering
the opinion of the Court. Known not only for his passion and
hard work, but also for his charm, Justice Brennan frequently
labored to win over as many Justices as possible to strengthen
the force of his majority opinions. 2 50 Despite the hesitation that
some Justices may have had, all joined in Brennan's opinion. 251
247. See supra text accompanying notes 88 and 174-75; see also Brief for
the Petitioner, supra note 111, at 15 (arguing primarily about tax immunity,
not regulatory immunity).
248. Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Michael Hagedorn, su-
pra note 107 (noting that there were some reservations about Justice Doug-
las).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 143-52.
250. See Owen Fiss, Tribute, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1120
(1991) ("Brennan could be trusted to choose his words in a way that would mi-
nimize the disagreement among the [Jiustices, not only to avoid those silly
squabbles.., but also to produce a majority opinion and strengthen the force
of what the Court had to say."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice:
Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the
Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 772 n.56 (2006) ("Justice Brennan was
well known for using his personal charm and his related ability to forge major-
ities on the Court.").
251. A letter from Justice Harry Blackmun to Justice Brennan is illustra-
tive of some of the behind-the-scenes navigation Brennan used to strengthen
his majority opinion. Blackmun suggested a softening of the language in the
opinion, writing:
I know all "these guys" on the Minnesota Court. For some reason the
sentence near the middle of page 9 beginning with the word "Accor-
dingly" struck me as a little blunt .... Do you think it could be soft-
ened, as by inserting the words "we feel that" before "the construc-
tion"? ... [I]f we can, I prefer to take a sympathetic approach this
time.
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 4, 1976) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Collections of the Manuscript Division); see
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Evidence of Justice Brennan's persuasive powers can be seen in
the few words written on the Justices' letters to Brennan indi-
cating that they would join. A letter from Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr. stated, "I am following my Brother White's capitulation
to your persuasive powers! Please join me also."252 Justice
White's capitulation, however, had not been without reserva-
tion. He stated, "Dear Bill: I was the other way in this case but
I shall acquiesce with a graveyard dissent."253
Justice Brennan's persuasive powers clearly went beyond
the ability to convince his fellow Justices to join him on the is-
sue at hand. Eleven years after the Bryan decision was issued,
the graveyard dissenter would be writing the majority opinion
in Cabazon, affirming the broadest interpretation of the Court's
holding in Bryan.254
C. THE SCHOLARLY RECEPTION
In hindsight, the Bryan decision is surprising not only for
its breadth, but also its interpretative methodology. According
to Professors Philip Frickey and William Eskridge, the Court
"ignore[d the] apparent textual meaning" of Public Law 280
when it ruled for the Bryans:
On the face of the statute, Minnesota probably had the better argu-
ment. [As for legislative history,] if the enacting Congress had been
asked about the Bryan issue while it was considering Public Law 280,
one would guess that the answer would have supported Minnesota as
well. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a Congress in this century
that seemed more clearly animated by the desire to destroy tribal so-
vereignty.... By the time Bryan made its way to the Supreme Court,
the firmly established federal policy was to promote tribal sovereign-
ty.255
Frickey has challenged the Court's reliance on the familiar
Indian law canon of construction that statutes passed for the
benefit of Indian tribes are to be liberally construed in their fa-
also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 386 (reflecting the text that Justice Blackmun re-
quested be included).
252. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
to William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 4, 1976)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Collections of the Manuscript Division).
253. Letter from Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 4, 1976) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Collections of the Manuscript Division).
254. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209-
10 (1987) (White, J.).
255. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 91, at 374-75 (footnote omitted).
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vor, with ambiguities being resolved in favor of the Indians. 256
He argues that the canon is inapplicable because the justifica-
tion for the canon was absent: "Public Law 280 is a statute de-
signed to undermine, not enhance, the authority of tribes."257
Yet, despite the unusual interpretive approach, which Frickey
and Eskridge have labeled "practical reasoning,"258 Frickey
agreed with the result.259
Frickey found the Court to be unusually forthright in
Bryan in going beyond the text of the statute as well as the
likely intent of the enacting Congress to consider the ramifica-
tions of the broader issue to contemporary Indian policy. 260 To
Frickey, Bryan is a paradigmatic example of a phenomenon
that happens often in Supreme Court decision making, yet that
is seldom quite as obvious. 261 Frickey prefers the approach used
in Bryan to the more traditional approach that would yield
blind obedience to the dead hand of a long-since adjourned
Congress. 262 As in Bryan, courts should "fuse the contemporary
horizon with past congressional expectations, not ... ignore the
former in misguided allegiance to the latter."263 Moreover, since
the federal-tribal relationship is an ongoing one and congres-
256. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 63, at
119.
257. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1168 (1990). A
problem with this theory is that it ignores a more fundamental problem with
the canon: its terms are so ambiguously broad as to make it elastic enough to
be applied in virtually any context involving Indians. Indeed, from the stand-
point of Indians, many harmful laws, from the allotment acts to Public Law
280, have been enacted ostensibly for the benefit of the Indians. For example,
the allotment acts, through which Indian tribes ultimately lost nearly 100 mil-
lion acres of land, were frequently justified on the basis that they would assist
with the advancement of Indians. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Braid of
Feathers: Pluralism, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and the Importance of Tribal
Court Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 557, 580 (1996) (reviewing FRANK
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS (1995)). Likewise, Public Law 280 mas-
queraded as a law designed to address the problem of "lawlessness" on Indian
reservations, a purpose that was certainly designed to benefit Indians. See su-
pra note 64 and accompanying text.
258. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 91, at 354-62 (describing the con-
siderations used in the practical reasoning model).
259. Id. at 375 ("[W]e believe the case was correctly decided....").
260. Id. at 373-74.
261. See Frickey, supra note 257, at 1165-67, 1179 (demonstrating that the
Court used post enactment considerations when analyzing Public Law 280 in
Bryan, rather than strictly adhering to the language of the statute).
262. See id. at 1179.
263. Id. at 1212.
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sional power in the field is plenary, post-enactment develop-
ments in Congress ought to be relevant, especially in cases in
which they render obsolete the intentions behind the original
enactment.
264
Frickey argues that the decision in Bryan reflects the
Court's appreciation of the "structural values at stake."265 He
compliments the Court on the best "instinctive approximation
of Chief Justice Marshall's methodology in Worcester [v. Geor-
gia]266 as is found in any modern case."267 Worcester, which was
the last of the so-called Marshall trilogy of cases on Indian
law, 268 reflected, of course, Marshall's most sophisticated un-
derstanding of the proper role of tribes in the United States.
Thus, this is a high compliment indeed.
Bryan may well have been a high-water mark for the
Court's willingness to admit to a kind of practical reasoning
and dynamic interpretation that Frickey endorses, 269 at least in
the Indian law context. 270 Though it may have been a rare and
noteworthy example of candidness from the Court in the rea-
soning of its decisions, and a paradigm of a contextual basis for
reaching decisions regarding old legislation, it is even more im-
portant for another development it spawned.
264. See id. at 1212-14, 1239-40.
265. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Consti-
tutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381,
431 (1993).
266. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
267. Frickey, supra note 265, at 432. Frickey argues that both the Bryan
Court and the Worcester Court viewed the issues in the cases to be "structural
and rooted in sovereignty, rather than to involve the regulation of a disadvan-
taged minority group" and both "assumed a baseline of ongoing tribal sove-
reignty that should be judicially protected against all but clear congressional
intrusion." Id.
268. The other two cases in the trilogy are Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
269. Frickey notes that "the Court buried its best textual argument in a
footnote [which] suggests that it did not consider the apparent meaning of the
statutory language of great importance." Frickey, supra note 257, at 1166
n.173.
270. It is hard to imagine a more important case in which the Supreme
Court limited a federal statute in such a way, unless, of course, it is Cabazon,
which also dealt with Public Law 280 and followed Bryan's narrow interpreta-
tion. In affirming Bryan and its broad implications, Cabazon also focused
strongly on contemporary federal policy specific to Indian gaming. See Califor-
nia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1987) (refe-
rencing President Reagan's statements in regard to Indian policy, as well as
then-current policies of the Department of the Interior).
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IV. THE RISE OF INDIAN GAMING
While a casual observer might have viewed Bryan as an
unimportant tax case, and been justified in doing so based on
the newspaper headlines, 271 the opinion was breathtaking in
scope. The Court's broad holding that Public Law 280 did not
confer "general state civil regulatory control over Indian reser-
vations" 272 was pregnant with possibility. During the years
around the time when Bryan was decided, Indian tribes em-
barked on many economic development initiatives. 273 At a time
of great progress in tribal governance on reservations, 274 Bryan
seems to have spurred even more creative thinking about tribal
economic development.
One noteworthy example is the Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, located in Southern California. Long before the Caba-
zon Band became famous for gaming and a Supreme Court case
bearing its name, it had opened a tribal tobacco smoke shop
with a mail-order cigarette business on the side. 275 The Caba-
zon Band was also operating a liquor sales enterprise. 276 More-
over, the Band's tribal council had to repeatedly beat back a
proposal from one of the Band's vice-chairmen to begin a mari-
juana cultivation business that would combine 'Indian tradi-
tional plants such as jimson weed, peyote and marijuana.' 277
The Cabazon Band approved a plan to begin a gambling
enterprise in June 1979, and gaming was underway by October
1980.278 Gaming on the Seminole Reservation in Florida
started even earlier. 279 By late 1979, three years after Bryan
271. See Cassano, supra note 226; Zuckerman, supra note 228; Justices Bar
State's Taxation of Reservation Indians, supra note 215; see also supra text ac-
companying notes 226-28 (illustrating that the newspaper headlines after the
Bryan decision all focused on the states' inability to tax Indian reservations).
272. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 (1976).
273. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads,
38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 790-93 (2006) (describing the rise of modern tribal self-
governance in the late 1960s and 1970s).
274. See id.
275. See AMBROSE I. LANE, SR., RETURN OF THE BUFFALO: THE STORY
BEHIND AMERICA'S INDIAN GAMING EXPLOSION 49-50 (1995) (discussing the
history of the Cabazon Band's gaming enterprise).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 34, 44-45, 54, 92.
278. See id. at 51-54, 60; W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS 48-49 (2000).
279. See Seminole Tribe of Florida, Seminole Casino Hollywood, http://www
.seminoletribe.comlenterprises/hollywoodcasino.shtml (last visited Mar. 6,
2008) ("Seminole Casino Hollywood was the first high stakes operation in the
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was decided, the Seminole Tribe was embroiled in litigation
with Broward County over the legality of the Seminole Tribe's
high-stakes bingo operation. 280  Other tribal operations
spawned litigation as well.28 1 In general, the lower courts had
read Bryan broadly and had developed a theory as to the civ-
il/regulatory and criminal/prohibitory distinction that Bryan
interpreted Public Law 280 to create. 28 2 As cases percolated in
the federal courts all over the country, and in several different
federal circuit courts, it became apparent that the issue might
reach the Supreme Court.28 3
A. THE REPRISE OF BRYAN IN THE CABAZON BRIEFING
Litigation in the federal courts in Florida and California
culminated in the 1987 Supreme Court case California v. Ca-
bazon Band of Mission Indians.284 The practical issue was
whether an Indian tribe could conduct gaming in a Public Law
280 state that had criminal prohibitions against gaming that
was not in compliance with the state's regulatory laws. 28 5 The
legal question was whether Bryan's prohibition on state regula-
tory authority applied, or whether the criminal provisions of
Public Law 280 could be read broadly to confer state authority
over regulatory offenses.286
country opening on December 14, 1979 at 5:00pm[, a]fter court challenges by
the State of Florida ....").
280. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311 (5th Cir.
1981).
281. See, e.g., Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp.
712, 713 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (involving bingo operations on an Indian reserva-
tion).
282. See, e.g., Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v.
Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the California
bingo laws were civil/regulatory and thus could not be applied to Indian reser-
vations); Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 311, 316 (holding that the Florida law pro-
hibiting bingo was "civil/regulatory," not "criminal/prohibitory," and thus could
not be applied to the Seminole Tribe); Oneida Tribe of Indians, 518 F. Supp. at
720 (holding that Wisconsin's regulation of bingo could not be applied to the
Oneida Tribe because it was a civil regulation).
283. See supra note 282; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan,
626 F. Supp. 245, 245 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that Connecticut could not re-
gulate bingo games occurring on an Indian reservation).
284. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
285. Id. at 207 (discussing the scope of jurisdiction in Public Law 280
states).
286. See Appellants' Closing Brief at 14-15, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-
1708) (arguing that Public Law 280 gives California the ability to enforce its
gaming prohibitions); Brief of Appellees at 7-8, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No.
2008] 959
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
That the scope of Bryan was the heart of the issue in Caba-
zon was apparent from the briefs. Nearly all of the briefs sub-
mitted to the Court include an extensive discussion of Bryan.2s7
The briefs submitted by California and its amici in the litiga-
tion argued that Bryan should be interpreted narrowly, its
holding applying only to cases involving state tax laws.288 They
argued that the broad prohibition on state civil regulatory au-
thority was dicta.28 9 Instead, they argued that the Court should
follow Rice v. Rehner,290 a case that had narrowly upheld state
authority in the context of liquor licensing.291
85-1708) (arguing that Public Law 280 does not confer state jurisdiction over
regulatory matters such as gaming).
287. See Brief of the Appellants at 9, 34-42, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-
1708); Appellants' Closing Brief, supra note 286, at 14-15; Brief of Appellees,
supra note 286, at 11, 33, 35-36, 39, 42-43, 47 n.33, 48-49; Brief of the States
of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the State of California at 3, 6-7,
21-23, 25, 27-28, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708) [hereinafter Arizona
Brief]; Amici Curiae Brief of Chehalis Indian Tribe et al. in Support of Appel-
lees at 2, 13-15, 18, 22, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708) [hereinafter
Chehalis Brief]; Amici Curiae Brief of States of Florida et al. in Support of
Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 16, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-
1708) [hereinafter Florida Brief]; Brief for Amicus Curiae State of Minnesota
in Support of Appellants at 3, 7-9, 20 n.9, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-
1708) [hereinafter Minnesota Brief]; Brief Amici Curiae of Pueblo of Laguna et
al. at 10, 12, 18-19, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708); Brief of the San
Manuel Band of Mission Indians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at
5, 15-16, 19-21, 26-31, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708); Brief of the Tu-
lalip Tribes of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Cabazon
and Morongo Tribes at 15-17, 21, 27, 39, 41-62, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No.
85-1708) [hereinafter Tulalip Brief]; Brief of the States of Washington et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 4, 9-12, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No.
85-1708) [hereinafter Washington Brief]. For briefs that did not discuss Bryan
extensively, see Brief of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Appellees at 7-8, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708); Motion
of the Pueblo of Sandia et al. for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae at 24, Caba-
zon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708); and Brief of the Seminole Tribe of Florida and
the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa of Minnesota as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of the Appellees, Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (No. 85-1708) [herein-
after Seminole Brief].
288. See Brief of the Appellants, supra note 287, at 35 (noting that unlike
California's gaming laws, "the property tax laws involved in Bryan were not
regulatory; they raised revenue but did not regulate conduct"); Florida Brief,
supra note 287, at 16 (disagreeing with lower courts' interpretation of Bryan
by arguing that "the courts fashioned a legal theory premised on this Court's
ruling in a tax case").
289. See Appellants' Closing Brief, supra note 286, at 14-15; Brief of the
Appellants, supra note 287, at 9.
290. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
291. See id. at 734-35; Brief of the Appellants, supra note 287, at 35 (ar-
guing that in Rice, the Court itself "cast doubts on Bryan's 'civil regulatory-
criminal prohibitory' distinction").
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California and several amici also used the briefing in the
Cabazon case to attempt to reargue Bryan. California asserted
that Bryan's interpretation of Public Law 280 actually left
states with narrower jurisdiction than they would have had
without Public Law 280.292 In an amicus brief, the State of Ari-
zona argued that the Bryan Court overlooked legislative history
that would support the conclusion that Public Law 280 would
grant states jurisdiction in the context of a regulation that has
a penal sanction. 293 Likewise, Minnesota's amicus brief argued
that Cabazon was an opportunity for the Court to "re-examine
some of its own dicta in Bryan" and to straighten out extreme
interpretations of Bryan by the lower courts in various gaming
cases. 294 Using a slightly different tactic, the State of Washing-
ton's amicus brief sought to distinguish Bryan. It argued that
Bryan's interpretation of section 4 of Public Law 280 (the sec-
tion on state civil adjudicatory authority) had no limiting effect
on the scope of section 2 (state criminal authority), and since
the consequence of violating the California regulatory law is
penal, the law should fall under the scope of California's crimi-
nal jurisdiction. 295
The brief by the Cabazon Band rebuffed state attempts to
narrow Bryan, arguing:
Bryan v. Itasca County is an important cornerstone in the foundation
of Indian tribal self-determination. It is not surprising, then, that the
appellants seek to narrow its scope by arguing that it applies only to
state taxation powers. Although the appellants contend that it was
mere dicta, we believe that the Court meant what it repeatedly said
292. Brief of the Appellants, supra note 287, at 35-36.
293. See Arizona Brief, supra note 287, at 23-24. The Arizona brief also
took issue with the Bryan Court's selective reliance on Carole Goldberg's ar-
ticle, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation In-
dians. See Goldberg, supra note 64. In a curious argument that essentially
elevated Goldberg's article to a status above the actual legislative history of
Public Law 280 or the Supreme Court's own analysis, Arizona accused the
Bryan Court of failing to acknowledge statements in Goldberg's article which
would support state jurisdiction where there is a penal sanction for a regula-
tion. See Arizona Brief, supra note 287, at 23-26.
294. Minnesota Brief, supra note 287, at 3.
295. Washington Brief, supra note 287, at 11-12. The brief notes:
Can a State circumvent the holding of Bryan engrafting criminal
sanctions onto its tax laws, for example, and thereby make them ap-
plicable to reservation Indians? We would agree that the States may
not do this. But the reason is not to be found in the illusory distinc-
tion developed by the lower courts. Rather, it is to be found in the
language of § 2(b) .... Congress, in § 2(b), carefully excluded from the
scope of § 2(a) any such use of its criminal law system.
2008]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in Bryan: that Congress, in enacting PL-280, did not intend to confer
upon the states "general civil regulatory powers, including taxation."
In addition, the Court quoted from and cited with approval Santa Ro-
sa Band, a case not involving taxation, but the application of local
building codes and zoning ordinances, giving further indication that a
narrow reading of Bryan would be improper. 296
The Band recognized that though Bryan dealt with taxation
and the Court here faced gaming, "the overriding concern is the
same: protecting the economic security of fragile tribal govern-
ments from unwarranted state intervention. No persuasive ar-
gument has been advanced in this case that would justify any
weakening of Bryan. 297
Several of the tribal amicus briefs unabashedly adopted
the strategy successful in Bryan which called upon the Court to
use the interpretive approach that Frickey later labeled "prac-
tical reasoning."298 They argued that Indian gaming advanced
the then-current governmental policy of tribal self-sufficiency
and thus urged a narrow reading of Public Law 280.299
The tribal amicus briefs strongly rejected the argument
that Bryan's statements on regulatory authority were dicta.30 0
The Tulalip Tribe of Washington, for example, noted that the
Court explicitly recognized how its interpretation in Bryan
would affect "other regulatory assertions of state jurisdic-
tion."30 1 Indeed, the Bryan opinion identified the "lack of intent
to grant such [state] regulatory authority as a basic premise of
its decision" and noted this lack of intent "at least four different
times."30 2
296. Brief of Appellees, supra note 286, at 42-43 (citation omitted); see also
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1975)
(involving the applicability of county zoning ordinances and building codes to
Indian reservations).
297. Brief of Appellees, supra note 286, at 43.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 256-64.
299. See Brief of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as Amicus Curiae
in Support of the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians of Califor-
nia at 2-3, 7, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987) (No. 85-1708); Seminole Brief, supra note 287, at 4.
300. See Tulalip Brief, supra note 287, at 41; see also Chehalis Brief, supra
note 287, at 13 (noting that Bryan "specifically held that state civil regulatory
laws were not included within Public Law 280's grant of jurisdiction").
301. Tulalip Brief, supra note 287, at 51.
302. Id. at 52.
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B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN CABAZON
Surprisingly, when the decision came out, Justice White,
the graveyard dissenter in Bryan,30 3 wrote the majority opi-
nion. 30 4 The Court upheld the principle from Bryan that Public
Law 280 embodied a distinction between civil/regulatory and
criminal/prohibitory state laws. 30 5 After reaffirming the central
reasoning of Bryan, the Court examined the lower court cases
that interpreted Bryan and refined the civil/regulatory-
criminal/prohibitory distinction. 30 6 It found the Barona Group
of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy 3 ° 7 and
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth30 8 decisions' applica-
tion of the civil/regulatory and criminal/prohibitory distinction
consistent with Bryan, and dismissed California's argument re-
garding Rice30 9 in a footnote. 310
In analyzing whether California's gaming laws should be
considered civil/regulatory, which under Bryan would deny the
state jurisdiction, or criminal/prohibitory, which would allow
state jurisdiction under Public Law 280, the Court held that
the gaming laws were in fact regulatory. 311 Dismissing Califor-
nia's argument that the civil/regulatory-criminal/prohibitory
distinction would be unworkable, the Court declined to find a
bright-line rule but concluded that the "lower courts have not
demonstrated an inability to identify prohibitory laws."3 12
Echoing the dynamic approach used in Bryan, the Court cited
the strong federal interest in the policy of tribal self-sufficiency
and independence as well as the Indians' sovereign tribal inter-
est in economic self-sufficiency and self-determination. 3 13
303. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
304. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 203.
305. Id. at 209.
306. Id. at 209-10.
307. 694 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the California
bingo laws were civil/regulatory and thus could not be applied to the Indian
reservations).
308. 658 F.2d 310, 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Florida law
prohibiting bingo was "civil/regulatory," not "criminal/prohibitory," and thus
could not be applied to the Seminole Tribe).
309. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 734-35 (1983) (upholding state authori-
ty in the context of liquor licensing).
310. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209-10 & n.8.
311. Id.at210-11.
312. Id. at 210-11 & n.10.
313. Id. at 216-19.
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The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Jus-
tices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, argued that
"Congress [had] not pre-empted California's prohibition against
high-stakes bingo games."314 The dissent did not seek to over-
rule Bryan but, consistent with the state arguments, attempted
to distinguish Bryan and confine it to its facts.315
Bryan provided the legal theory that authorized a handful
of Indian gaming operations in diverse locations around the
country. 316 Cabazon ignited an explosion. The right of Indian
tribes to conduct Indian gaming free of state interference, im-
plicitly recognized in Bryan, was now explicit. Indian gaming
was no longer a legal argument based on Bryan, but a legal
principle based on Cabazon.317
Within eighteen months of Cabazon, Congress enacted the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).318 The Act left in place
Bryan's general principle that Public Law 280 failed to give
states authority to regulate existing types of Indian gaming,
such as high-stakes bingo, but it created a lever that would al-
low states to demand regulatory authority over broader casino-
style gambling, such as roulette, slot machines, and house-
banked card games like blackjack. 319 The states' lever was this:
tribes could operate casino-style (Class III) gaming only if they
entered a tribal-state compact that addressed the state's legi-
timate regulatory concerns. 320
In the IGRA, Congress thus limited the Bryan principle, at
least in the gaming context, to the Cabazon facts. 321 Instead of
314. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. For example, the dissent drew a distinction between the state person-
al property tax at issue in Bryan and the commercial transactions between In-
dians and non-Indians at issue in Cabazon and in Rice. Id. at 223.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 275-80 (discussing the develop-
ment of gaming operations on Indian reservations after Bryan).
317. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (illustrating the rapid
growth in gaming revenues); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000) (affirming the
holding of Cabazon and stating that Congress finds that "Indian tribes have
the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming
activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a
State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit
such gaming activity").
318. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467
(1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)).
319. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gam-
ing, 4 NEV. L.J. 285, 289-93 (2003-2004).
320. See id. at 291.
321. See Washburn, supra note 10, at 428-30 (describing the effect of the
IGRA on Indian gaming).
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the unilateral authority under Public Law 280 to regulate In-
dian gaming, which they lost in Bryan and Cabazon, states now
have something less. The IGRA gives states negotiating author-
ity to demand that tribes consent to state regulatory authori-
ty.3 22 Absent Bryan's narrow interpretation of section 4 of Pub-
lic Law 280 (the civil adjudicatory authority section), however,
gaming may never have occurred and Cabazon likely would not
have been decided in such a way.323
V. BROADER INSIGHTS
It should now be quite obvious that Bryan was the legal
bedrock for the tribal authority to begin gambling operations.
The Indian gaming industry today, with approximately 387 in-
dividual Indian gaming enterprises, brings in more than twen-
ty-five billion dollars a year.324 Increasing well over twenty-fold
since the passage of the IGRA in 1988,325 total historical Indian
gaming revenue was over $170 billion and growing rapidly at
the end of 2006, the latest period for which there are records.3 26
322. See id. at 429-30; cf. Oversight Hearing on the Regulation of Indian
Gaming: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 38-42
(2005) (prepared statement of Kevin K. Washburn) (arguing that, in the wake
of Cabazon, the federal government should play a more active role in the regu-
lation of tribal gaming).
323. Bryan did not necessarily authorize Indian gaming outside of Public
Law 280 states. In the absence of Public Law 280, this authority presumably
was never in doubt. But it was in Public Law 280 states where Indian gaming
first flourished. Tribes in Public Law 280 states, such as Florida and Califor-
nia, had a much greater incentive to engage in Indian gaming than those in
other states because such tribes were located more strategically close to large
non-Indian populations that could make such gaming especially profitable. See
Washburn, supra note 319, at 287-88, 293-96 (analyzing the impact of Public
Law 280 and the factors that make Indian gaming successful).
324. Press Release, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, NIGC Announces 2006
Indian Gaming Revenue (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.nigc.gov/
ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PR63062007iPR63072007/tabidl784/Default.aspx
(putting the total Indian gaming revenue at $25,075,829,000 for 2006).
325. NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, supra note 10, at 8 (stating that the
size of the Indian gaming industry had increased nearly twenty-fold by 1999).
326. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GDD-97-91, TAX POLICY: A
PROFILE OF THE INDIAN GAMING INDUSTRY 6 fig.1 (1997) (displaying a chart
with Indian gaming revenues from 1985-1995, totaling nearly fifteen billion
dollars); NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, supra note 10, at 25 (reflecting the
tribal gaming revenues from 1996-1999, which totaled nearly thirty-two bil-
lion dollars); Press Release, supra note 324 (putting the total Indian gaming
revenue for 2006 at over twenty-five billion dollars); National Indian Gaming
Commission, Tribal Gaming Revenues 2000-2005, http://www.nigc.gov/
Portals/0/NIGC%2OUploads/Tribal%2OData/tribalgamingrevenuesO5.pdf (last
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Perhaps one of the most striking features of this legal narra-
tive, however, is that the tribal gaming phenomenon sprang di-
rectly from tribal economic poverty.
A. THE MORAL HIGH GROUND OF POVERTY
Helen Bryan might never have called the Legal Services
Project but for her desperate need to avoid the county tax
bill.327 It was legal services attorneys, sometimes called "pover-
ty lawyers," who brought the Bryan case. 328 Indeed, poverty
was not only a background dynamic in the case. Bernie Becker
placed Indian poverty front and center at oral argument, rebut-
ting Justice White's argument that living in trailer homes was
a cultural choice by highlighting the fact that those living in
mobile homes were among the poorest of the poor.329 Even the
State's attorney, C.H. Luther, facilitated this view of the case,
suggesting that inheritance taxes were irrelevant to Indians.330
The poverty manifested in Bryan thus may have provided
the higher purpose for the decision, and perhaps helped to pave
the way for the economic activity explicitly protected in Caba-
zon and, later, the IGRA. The victory in Bryan may thus indi-
rectly support the hypothesis that it is the moral high ground of
poverty, not aggressive assertions of sovereignty, that has
tended to account for past tribal victories in the Supreme
Court. 33 1 Legal scholar Sam Deloria has suggested that the loss
of the perception of poverty will prove costly to tribes in litiga-
tion and public policy, which will be an especially bitter result
for those poor tribes without gaming who continue to occupy
the same barren ground that they occupied before the gaming
phenomenon. 332
visited Mar. 6, 2008) (showing the tribal gaming revenues from 2000-2005,
totaling just over ninety-seven billion dollars).
327. See Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
329. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 22-23; see also
supra text accompanying notes 177-79 (describing the discussion of poverty
during the oral argument).
330. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 27 (responding to
a Justice's question about state imposition of inheritance taxes, C.H. Luther
stated that "the Indians are so impoverished that it is doubtful that the inhe-
ritance tax would apply").
331. See Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of In-
dian Nations, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 60 (2002) (discussing the moral superiority
associated with poverty and oppression).
332. See id.
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B. LEGAL SERVICES ATTORNEYS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LAW
The Bryan victory and many others demonstrate the power
of legal services attorneys in establishing and protecting Indian
legal rights. This victory was a significant achievement not so
much for any single attorney, but for the Legal Services Project
as an organization. Indeed, at each stage the Bryan litigation
was handled by a different attorney. 333 Though the attorneys
changed, the broader organization kept pressing the case.
Though one might think that legal services offices are
sometimes handicapped by inexperienced attorneys and high
rates of turnover, 334 Bryan demonstrates that even attorneys
who stay only a short time can collectively have an outsized
impact on the law. Indeed, while personalities in these cases
sometimes stand out, one lesson from the Bryan victory is that
no single "hero" can produce a victory alone. For every Becker
or Brennan, there are numerous other people indispensable to
achieving the result. The Bryan victory never would have hap-
pened without the help of several legal aid attorneys who
started the litigation and kept it moving. 335
Through the late 1960s and 1970s, legal aid attorneys
around the country-lawyers at local and regional legal servic-
es offices, the nationally active Indian law experts at NARF
and the DNA-People's Legal Services on the Navajo Reserva-
tion-helped Indian people and tribes achieve landmark rul-
ings in the Supreme Court and in numerous lower courts.
Without the work of these attorneys, the complexion of federal
Indian law might be far different.3 36 Their victories suggest
333. Patrick Moriarty filed the complaint. See supra text accompanying
notes 32-34. Nicholas Norden substituted in as counsel while the case was
pending in the state district court. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
Jerry Seck argued the state appeal. See supra text accompanying note 57.
Kent Peterson filed the petition for certiorari. See supra text accompanying
notes 104-05. Bernie Becker argued before the Supreme Court. See supra text
accompanying notes 135-79 and 200-10.
334. See Jack Katz, Lawyers for the Poor in Transition: Involvement,
Reform, and the Turnover Problem in the Legal Services Program, 12 LAW &
SocY REV. 275, 286-97 (1978).
335. The work of a law professor, Carole Goldberg, also loomed large in the
oral argument and the Supreme Court's decision in the case. See Goldberg, su-
pra note 64; supra text accompanying notes 145-47, 231-34, and 242-44.
336. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Allottees Association and Affiliated
Tribes and Bands of the Quinault Reservation et al. in Support of Respon-
dents, Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (No. 95-1595) (illustrating the
involvement of the DNA-People's Legal Services attorneys); Brief of Native
American Rights Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, McClana-
han v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (No. 71-834) (illustrating
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that the many capable attorneys who staff legal services offices
today can also change the world, in ways both big and small. 337
C. LESSONS ON CAREFUL LAWYERING AND AMBITIOUS JUDGING
The most striking aspect of Bryan itself is the broad scope
of the Court's opinion. At times in the litigation, attorneys
along the way regretted the decision not to argue that the mo-
bile home constituted real property because it was affixed to
the land.3 38 Yet it was the original decision not to make this the
central and obvious argument and to argue a far broader posi-
tion that ultimately made Bryan such an important precedent.
The initial aggressive position taken by the attorney who
drafted the complaint cast the die. 339 The ultimate holding,
that Public Law 280 did not confer state civil/regulatory au-
thority on Indian reservations, was far more important to tri-
bes than a holding that mobile homes constituted real property,
even if such a holding could have been reached as a principle of
federal law. Even a decision holding that states cannot tax In-
dian personal property on Indian reservations would not have
had such broad ramifications. In this bet, perhaps the first ma-
the involvement of the Native American Rights Fund); see also Babbitt, 519
U.S. at 236-37 (finding an escheat-to-tribe provision of the Indian Land Con-
solidation Act was an unconstitutional taking); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165
(holding that a state income tax applied to reservation Indians, derived solely
from reservations sources, was unlawful).
337. However, the Legal Services Corporation has undergone dramatic
changes since the Bryan era. During the Reagan administration, the Legal
Services Corporation saw its budget reduced significantly. See Liza Q. Wirtz,
Note, The Ethical Bar and the LSC: Wrestling with Restrictions on Federally
Funded Legal Services, 59 VAND. L. REV. 971, 983-84 (2006). In 1996, the Le-
gal Services Corporation's budget was cut by over forty percent, forcing offices
to reduce case loads and leave hundreds of thousands of cases unfinished. Id.
Moreover, Congress went beyond the budget cuts to undermine the power of
the Legal Services Corporation and enact significant limitations on how the
Legal Services Corporation funding could be spent. See Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-53. This appropriations legislation prohibited Legal Services Cor-
poration-funded programs from bringing or participating in class action law-
suits. See id.; Wirtz, supra, at 994. This development limited the ability of
such offices to continue to do "impact" litigation. See Wirtz, supra, at 994-95.
Attorneys in legal services offices continue to have the ability to represent
clients like the Bryans, but they would no longer be able to style the case as a
class action. Moreover, the extreme caseload placed on legal services attorneys
would likely prohibit attorneys from reducing their case load, as Seck did, in
order to spend time on larger issues.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34, 88, and 174.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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jor bet related to Indian gaming, a very aggressive gamble paid
off.
Are Seck and Becker's efforts to narrow the argument sur-
prising? Not really. Lawyers tend not to be gamblers. By na-
ture, lawyers are risk averse.340 Once a case is framed, litiga-
tors tend to want to win, and they sometimes are willing to look
at the case far more narrowly to ensure a victory.3 4 1 The law-
yers in Bryan began with a broad proposition and then sought
to narrow it after they had lost in the state district court. It is a
natural reaction, after losing, to seek to narrow the argument
in hopes of a win.
Should the attorneys be criticized for attempting to narrow
their argument? Perhaps not. Perhaps Becker seemed more
careful and less bold to the Court for offering a more modest
avenue to rule for the Bryans.342 In any event, both the state
supreme court and the U.S. Supreme Court forced the appellate
attorney to stick with the original bet.343
The gamble in this case paid off, probably because of the
personality of Justice Brennan. 344 Though he infamously once
disparaged an Indian law case as unimportant, 345 he single-
handedly ensured that Bryan would never be so characterized,
and thereby helped spawn an entire industry. In so doing,
Brennan ignored cautious lawyers who sought a more narrow
victory and won over Justices who might have dissented. If
Brennan was motivated by poverty, then Bryan was a remark-
able step toward addressing poverty nationwide, whether or
340. Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing
Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 404 (2004).
341. See id. (describing the cognitive biases that influence lawyers' decision
making).
342. See supra text accompanying note 174 (indicating that Becker sought
to conclude his oral argument by attempting to resurrect the argument that
the mobile home constituted real property).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 98 and 245-47.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 250-54 (describing Justice Bren-
nan's charm and remarkable ability to gain the support of other Justices).
345. See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT 359 (1979) ("One decision [Brennan] was assigned to
write.., addressed the question of whether Indians in Washington state could
hunt and fish in the off season .... Brennan seethed at having to write this
'chickenshit case."'). In a similar fashion, former Deputy Solicitor General
Louis Claiborne, using Bryan as an example, once said that many Indian cases
were unanimous because none of the Justices were interested enough to dis-
sent. Louis F. Claiborne, Special Feature, The Trend of Supreme Court Deci-
sions in Indian Cases, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 585, 586 (1998).
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not Brennan could have possibly forecasted the importance of
the case.
POSTSCRIPT
Thirty-five years after she first contacted the Leech Lake
Legal Services Project, Helen Bryan still lives on the same plot
of land on the Leech Lake Reservation. 4 6 Her five children are
grown.347 The trailer home that gave rise to the litigation has
long been sold and replaced by a four-bedroom house where He-
len Bryan, now Helen Johnson, is living in her retirement. 348
Perhaps as a result of gaming revenues, the house was fi-
nanced by the tribe. 349
In a recent interview, Helen sat in a modest conference
room with the current crop of legal services attorneys and staff
in the offices of the organization that is now called Anishinabe
Legal Services. 350 Over a catered luncheon of fresh walleye and
blueberry pie, she offered her memories of receiving the tax no-
tice and calling the legal services office. 351 Behind her on the
wall of the conference room hung a decorative plaque with a
famous quote by Margaret Mead: "Never doubt that a small
group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world.
Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has."3 52
346. See Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
347. See id.
348. Id.
349. Telephone Interview by Julie A. Strother with Helen Johnson, supra
note 15.
350. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
351. Interview with Helen Johnson, supra note 1.
352. Id. (highlighting the quote on the wall of the Anishinabe Legal Servic-
es office).
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